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Foreword
The Evaluation Unit of the Directorate General for
External Relations (DG 1A) of the European
Commission was set up in response to the
Commission’s Sound and Effective Management
initiative (SEM 2000) and has been operational
since January 1997. It has the mandate of
conducting, on a systematic, timely and rigorous
basis, evaluations of the programmes for which
this Directorate General is responsible.
One of the first tasks of the newly formed unit has
been to undertake interim evaluations of both the
Phare and Tacis programmes. These evaluations
are part of the Commission’s answer to the
European Parliament’s demand, put forward in its
Resolution on the General Budget of the
European Union for the 1996 Financial Year (A4-
0235/95), that an interim evaluation of the
programmes should be transmitted to the
European Parliament before the end of June
1997.
The call for an interim evaluation issues a
challenge which is daunting in terms of both the
methodology to be followed and the amount of
data to be processed. The methodology of
evaluation of technical assistance programmes,
more than any other form of assistance, is a
disputed issue among specialists. The
measurement of the impact of such programmes
is more difficult in countries evolving as swiftly
and variably as those of Central and Eastern
Europe and Central Asia. And lastly, the Phare
and Tacis programmes have since their genesis
been so broad in scope that no single study can
really hope to do justice to the subject.
The evaluation of the Tacis Programme takes as
its starting point the wealth of monitoring reports
on Tacis actions that have been prepared. It
builds on the experience of the teams which have
been monitoring the outputs of the Tacis
Programme, but which have not until now had to
consider its wider impact. The report finds that the
Tacis Programme’s contribution to the process of
transition has been relevant, though less effective
than it could have been for reasons that are
explained; on balance, however, in terms of
outputs delivered, the record is positive.
The two interim evaluations are intended to be
benchmarks upon which the Evaluation Unit will
conduct further sectoral and country evaluations,
using different methodologies and focusing more
closely on the individual issues involved. The
Commission is bound to report on its work
regularly to the European Parliament and the
Member States. By means of this dialogue, the
Commission hopes to contribute to a better
understanding of the processes of transition in the
countries of Central Europe as they face the
challenge of accession, and in the countries of
Eastern Europe and Central Asia as they develop
their relationship with the European Union.
Michael Lake
Head of the Evaluation Unit
Introduction
This Report
This report presents the findings, analyses and
recommendations of the team which undertook
the Tacis Interim Evaluation (TIE). The purpose
of the report is to inform the European Parliament
and the Member States about the activities,
results, effects and impact of the Tacis
Programme in the NIS.
Activities and Outputs
The TIE took place over a period of nine weeks
between 21 April and 26 June 1997. The
Evaluation Team consisted of ten consultants,
supported by staff of the Tacis Monitoring Teams
in Moscow, Kiev, Tbilisi and Almaty. In total,
more than 50 consultants made written
contributions and over 100 people were
interviewed. More than a thousand monitoring
reports were reviewed and a database of these
was prepared both for analytical purposes and for
future use by the Commission. Over twenty sector
reviews were prepared and then rationalised into
seven NIS-wide sector reviews. Numerous
reference documents were used. The final report
consists of this synthesis report and more than
1,000 pages of supporting analysis in annexes.
Interim Evaluation
The authors of this report recognise that, despite
the effort described above, they have only
presented a first review of Tacis achievements.
The title of the exercise – the Tacis Interim
Evaluation – is appropriate, the term “Interim”
having certain connotations which should be kept
in mind by the reader of this report:
· The report does not systematically cover
preparatory programming and financial
implementation. In other words, issues related
to the Tacis management structure and
management process and related to
accountability are raised only insofar as these
explain performance.
· The review has focused on the main delivery
mechanisms developed by Tacis, namely the
instruments, and thus may not do justice to the
contributions of some of the smaller “facilities”
(see paragraph 3.2. below).
· Data quality has been an issue no less than in
most other evaluations of TA programmes.
Systematically recorded data exist only on
contract finance and on project
implementation and effectiveness through
monitoring reports. No data of similar quality
exist for project effects, sustainability and
impact. The latter issue is, of course, common
in most evaluations and means that the
perceptions not only of the Evaluation Team,
but also the key actors in the programme, form
a central part of the overall analysis.
· In addition, the methodology needed to cope
with the assignment had to be developed and
implemented within an extremely limited time
period. This is evident in a number of
evaluation instruments which, while useful, are
crude and need further development by the
Evaluation Unit DG1A/F5 for future use in
other more detailed evaluations.
· Finally, it is considered best practice if ex-post
programme evaluations are undertaken jointly
by a team of independent experts from the
donor and partner countries. This was not the
case here. The EU entrusted the assignment
to the contractors supplying the Tacis
Monitoring Teams who, though having an
independent advisory role to play in the Tacis
Programme, are, in fact, programme actors
themselves and cannot, in principle, give an
entirely objective view of Tacis.
The Evaluation Unit recognised the
disadvantages of using monitors for this
evaluation but this had to be offset against the
advantage of mobilising expertise within a very
short space of time. The monitoring contractors,
NEI, IPS and SEMA, accordingly formed a
consortium with the NEI as lead partner. A direct
agreement contract was issued on 21 April 1997.
Simultaneously, the staff of the Tacis monitoring
teams in Moscow, Kiev, Tbilisi and Almaty were
instructed to assist the evaluation team with data
collection and analysis.
Key Evaluation Questions
The principal evaluation questions are outlined
below. These are the main propositions tested
throughout the study. The relevance of Tacis, the
ultimate reason for the evaluation, should be seen
as the sum of the findings relative to the
preceding research questions. As is the case of
all evaluations, this cannot be measured
quantitatively; a result is arrived at by the sum of
the different parts and their relative tendencies
towards an overall negative/positive or neutral
judgement. In addition to the overall relevance
question, two questions are posed relating to
recommendations for the future. The answers to
the latter are drawn from the findings and are of
course related to the final judgement of the
evaluation.
· What lessons have been learned about
technical assistance and Tacis as a TA
provider?
· How does the Tacis Programme compare in
size with the total volume of aid flows to the
NIS and the total volume of grant aid in the
form of TA for the NIS?
· What is Tacis spending its money on?
· Does Tacis address the priority needs of the
recipient governments?
· Does Tacis have an impact on addressing
these priority needs?
· What are the key factors which detract from
the performance of Tacis?
· Is the Tacis Programme relevant?
· What suggestions can be made to increase
the cost effectiveness and overall impact of
Tacis in the coming years?
· What comments arise from this TIE on the
future direction of Tacis?
Methodology and Terminology used
To assess relevance, the evaluation team has
tested Tacis Programme performance against the
following criteria which are part of the standard
methodology accepted for programme
evaluations: appropriateness; impact,
effectiveness and sustainability, efficiency,
transparency and accountability.
During the TIE different sources and types of
information were used including:
Existing documents including policy from the
EU and programming documents from the
Commission services relating to Tacis (IPs and
APs); project files and monitoring reports and
other Tacis evaluation material. New
documentation prepared especially as sector
background material for the TIE (country sector
reviews and NIS wide sector reviews) and for
obtaining insight into Tacis impact, cross cutting
theme papers. Proceedings on the four
workshop on Tacis performance, effectiveness
and the impact themes which were held in Almaty
on the 14th May, Yerevan, 24th May, Moscow
28th and 29th May and Kiev on the 2nd of June.
Formal questionnaires were used to assess the
views of the Tacis national co-ordinators in the
NIS and the CU Directors on the performance and
impact of Tacis and last but not least, Interview
notes, prepared by the evaluation team after
their interviews. The Commission has supplied
the financial and administrative data on overall
Tacis budget allocations, contracting and
payments. The quantitative analysis on
programme performance, effectiveness,
sustainability and efficiency are based on the
Tacis monitoring data base prepared for this
study.
Evaluation criteria and Terminology
Relevance: Term reserved for the overall
judgement by the evaluators on the performance
of the programme against all evaluation criteria.
Appropriateness: The degree of success of the
Commission in identifying and selecting those
issues for Tacis support which can be considered
to be the most urgent in terms of NIS priority
needs for TA; and most suitable for TA from the
Commission Services and the EU, given their
mandate, the available know how in the EU
member states, and taking into account the
policies of the Commission and the Union towards
the NIS.
Impact: The contributions from the Tacis
Programme to the content and pace of market
economic reforms and the reinforcement of
democracy in the NIS and Mongolia. As
mentioned before an authoritative conclusion on
this criteria is beyond the scope of this TIE.
Instead the term impact has been defined here in
terms of Tacis contributions to: (i) attitude
changes; (ii) policy changes;(iii) capacity
development in public and private sector
institutions; (iv) capacity development in the field
of training and education; (v) welfare, enforcing
democracy and civil society; and finally (vi)
unintended positive and negative side effects
from the programme.
Effectiveness: The extent to which the Tacis
partner organisations (POs) who receive the
assistance successfully utilise the project outputs
to achieve the project objectives in such a way
that the problems identified during project
selection as priorities for Tacis assistance are
either solved, or are brought better under control.
Sustainability: The durability of project
achievements (effects) beyond the ending date of
Tacis project support.
Efficiency: The degree to which the projects
realise their planned outputs within the time, input
and budget limitations set by the contract.
Transparency: The clarity of processes and
information flows required for decision making.
Accountability: Implementation in accordance
with the operational guidelines that have been
adopted for Tacis.
The Structure of the Report
The report starts with an Executive Summary
followed by a Synthesis Report. These deal with
the main evaluation questions and present the
findings, explanations for the findings and the
implications that can be drawn for the future. This
information is extracted from seven annexes and
five working files which are available for
reference purposes on request.
Annex 1 – Framework & Contexts provides a
summary of the methodology and an associated
methodology guide used in the evaluation. It also
sets a context for Tacis as a technical co-
operation programme and as such, provides the
related information about Official Development
Assistance (ODA) and the place of technical
assistance (TA) in it, both generally and at the
level of NIS. In addition, it contains a literature
review which gives an insight into the peculiarities
of Tacis in the context of other donor
programmes and technical co-operation practices
both generally and within the NIS.
Annex 2 – Programme Description gives a
factual description of Tacis programming
information. The purpose of this annex is to show
how Tacis funds have been allocated, committed
and paid per country, per sector and per budget
year.
Annex 3 – Appropriateness of Tacis
Programming focuses on whether Tacis
programming was appropriate in view of the
changing needs of NIS partners and EU policies,
taking into account the geopolitical differences
which have emerged since 1989 in the NIS group
and given their different transition and
development paths.
Annex 4 – Review of Tacis Implementation is
concerned with an assessment of Tacis efficiency
and effectiveness. The assessment uses a Tacis
monitoring database which was developed and
used during this evaluation and covers more than
90 per cent of the Tacis project portfolio of
monitorable projects, 1010 records in total. The
assessment asks if the Tacis delivery
mechanisms (instruments) are the right ones.
Performance is revealed through seven NIS-wide
sector reviews (based on more than 60 country
level sector reviews).
Annex 5 – Analysis of Tacis Impact defines the
criteria for impact assessment and provides
results from sector reviews and cross-cutting
themes. The latter six themes, which cut across
the Tacis sectors/indicative support areas, include
NIS Policy and Strategy Development, Public
Sector Institutional Development, Private Sector
Institutional Development, Education/Managerial
and Manpower Training, Reinforcing Democracy
and Civil Society and Social Welfare. The first
four themes give insight into the extent to which
Tacis has had an impact on its first programme
goal, namely market reform, with the last two
themes addressing the question as to the extent
to which Tacis has had an impact on its second
programme goal, namely reinforcing democracy.
This annex is based on interviews and four
workshops on the impact themes, which were
held in Almaty on 14 May, Yerevan on 24 May,
Moscow on 28 and 29 May and Kiev on 2 June.
Annex 6 – The Monitoring Database explains the
construction, content, structure and programming
of the database, its content relative to total
funding (and the use of funding not covered by it),
reviews its use in this study and makes
recommendations about future use and
maintenance. It covers 78% of all projects with a
budget of ECU 300,000 or higher and 85% of the
value of these projects. The average project size
in the database is 1.15 MECU. The total value of
the projects in the database amounts to 1.16 bln
ECU and this is equivalent to 55% of all contracts
signed in the Tacis Programme in the period
1991-96.
Annex 7 – Persons Interviewed and Attending
Workshops, is a list showing participation.
Working Files 1-5 cover the country and area
sector reviews, Tacis Programme description on
the basis of ten-liners (projects described in 10
lines), 64 case studies, and interview notes.
Executive summary
This report presents the findings, analyses and
recommendations of the team which undertook
the Tacis Interim Evaluation (TIE). The purpose
of the report is to inform the European Parliament
and the EU Council of Ministers concerning the
activities, results, effects and impact of the Tacis
Programme in the NIS.
Through the Tacis Programme, the EU helps to
bring about the transition to the market economy
and the reinforcement of democracy in the NIS
and Mongolia. Funding by way of grant, the
programme provides predominantly technical
assistance (hereinafter referred to as TA) for the
transfer of know-how, with a minor component of
investment.
In order to evaluate the overall relevance of the
programme, the Evaluation Team has applied a
number of criteria which are standard in
programme evaluations: appropriateness,
effectiveness, efficiency, transparency and
accountability.
The Evaluation Team concludes that:
Tacis is making a relevant contribution to its
programme objectives, notwithstanding
progress in the NIS towards free and open
democratic systems observing human rights and
towards market-oriented economic systems which
has been much slower than some expected and
all hoped for;
Relevance has been limited by shortcomings
in terms of management efficiency,
transparency and an over-emphasis by
Commission services and EU institutions on
financial and administrative procedures. This
by-product of the European Commission’s
corporate culture reflects a bias towards concern
with financial procedure to the detriment of
programme performance; in turn, this is a
reflection of the pressures of the EU institutions
which set the environment in which the
Commission operates;
The programme can be credited with a
positive record on project effectiveness in
achieving the intended objectives. For the
Evaluation Team, this was the decisive factor for
the positive final assessment of the programme;
Tacis has been praised and criticised from
both the EU and NIS side. This reflects partly
the political environment in which Tacis placed,
but it also indicates that there are serious
concerns about the relevance of the programme
and the lack of objective information in the NIS
about what Tacis is doing.
In the remainder of this executive summary, the
main findings are presented; recommendations
for further improving the relevance of the
programme are contained in the main report.
Programme background
The developments inside the Soviet Union during
the period 1986-1991 brought hope to its
population and to people in the western world that
a historical opportunity was presenting itself to
end the cold war, halt the arms race, break down
the walls that separated East and West and make
the world a better place generally.
In this historical setting, the European Union
decided to launch Tacis as a large-scale TA
programme and, later, to continue the assistance
for the NIS and Mongolia after its break-up of the
Soviet Union. In retrospect the Council’s decision
to provide support mainly in the form of technical
assistance rather than investment was wise and
prudent
In 1991, TA was – and in 1997 still is – the most
important form of support which the EU can give
its partners in the NIS and Mongolia. The
financial investment needs in the former Soviet
Union are huge, but the potential multiplier effect
of TA on economic growth is, at this stage, still
larger than the impact of similar amount of
investment inflows.
Private investment flows to the NIS are still
negligible (apart from investment in the strategic
oil and gas sectors). This shows that there is still
a need to work further to remove impediments to
commercial and investment flows; Tacis TA has
played a surprisingly small role in this context in
the past. The 1996 Financial Regulation provides
the framework to change this by foreseeing a
supportive role for Tacis in the wider PCA
context. In the 1996 and 1997 Action
Programmes this is reflected in “WTO” projects
which aim at supporting the integration of
individual NIS in the wider economic and political
systems.
Tacis is the largest TA programme for the former
Soviet Union, accounting for 36.5 per cent of total
TA flows over the period 1991-1996. Though
Tacis is relatively big in TA terms, per capita
grant assistance to the NIS is very low. For the
EU, as donor, this amounts to 1.4 ECU of EU tax
payers’ money per capita per year; for the NIS
population, this is equivalent to 1 ECU per capita
per year.
When assessing the relevance of the programme,
it should be borne in mind that the total budget is
almost negligible when compared with total
investment requirements in the NIS.
The Council Regulations of 1991 and 1993 have
served their main purpose well. The framework
thus set has been workable; the Tacis
Programme has been able to evolve.
The Evaluation Team considers the 1996 Council
Regulation adequate and sufficiently flexible for
the period 1996-1999. The Regulation confirmed
that TA provision remains the basic strategy of
Tacis for achieving its twin objectives; it set some
new accents which have an impact on the
evolution, direction and transparency of the
programme. The Regulation has, however,
increased bureaucracy and influenced
productivity.
Appropriateness of Programming
A clear Tacis position on policy issues in the
countries and in the priority sectors targeted for
Tacis assistance has not evolved during the years
1991-1996. The Tacis Council Regulations
identify indicative support areas but give little
guidance on the policy goals which the
programme wishes to pursue. The relatively high
turnover of Tacis top management and the
reorganisation of DG 1A/C from a sectoral to a
country grouping can be mentioned as two factors
which have not in the short-term been conducive
to clear policy formulation. Although, over the last
two years, policy statements on the future
relations between the EU and the NIS have been
drawn up by the European Union, these are not
clearly reflected in Tacis programming
documents. Likewise, the potential of Tacis as an
instrument of support to the implementation of the
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs)
between the European Union and the NIS has
only recently become a factor in Tacis
programming.
In the beginning, Tacis took the lead in what was
in effect a situation of the blind leading the blind.
In order to understand better the NIS needs, a
relatively high proportion of the Tacis budget was
utilised to fund sector studies/reviews. These
were strong on sector description but less strong
on understanding transition needs, priorities and
the feasibility of change.
The initial studies were more useful for Tacis than
for the Commission’s NIS partners. This has sown
the seeds of one of the persistent complaints
about Tacis, that the benefits of the programme
are greater for the EU than for its partner states in
the NIS. In retrospect, the NIS partners had a
point: the value of the insight generated by the
studies proved in many cases to be limited;
because the approach taken by the contractors
was often not in line with what is now considered
best practice. The studies (with some exceptions)
failed to realise their potential value as tools for
better understanding the transition problems
facing the sectors and facing key actors within the
sectors.
A relatively high proportion of the Tacis budget
and staff time has been spent on programming. In
order to focus better on the priority needs of the
NIS, a system of multi-annual Indicative
Programmes has evolved (supplemented by
annual programmes, in the case of Russia and
Ukraine, and two yearly programmes for the
remaining partner states). This involves a
consultation process which starts with a summary
paper on applications for support compiled by the
NIS authority dealing with Tacis: the National
Coordinators and the CU secretariat. This system
serves its purpose but is time- and resource-
intensive. Judgement of the appropriateness of
the outcome of this planning process is
impossible in the absence of an overall system
for identifying priority needs.
In 1992, the basic pattern for the allocation of
Tacis budget allocation per country was fixed,
with some subsequent changes over time which
can be considered sound. Due weight is given to
an equitable distribution between the partner
states, the track-record on reform, aid absorption
capacity and geopolitical factors, including NIS
political weight and the EU’s own economic
interests.
The changes in the sector allocations by and
large reflect the evolution of new policy priorities
in the NIS. In some cases, proactive policy from
the EU side shaped the allocations for some
sectors, such as that of support for small and
medium-sized enterprises.
Between 1991 and 1996, Tacis funded and
started up some 2000 projects. The main Tacis
database – Desiree – records the contracts
comprised within each project, rather than the
project itself. The precise number of projects has
not therefore been determined for the purpose of
this evaluation.
Effectiveness: the evidence from
the Tacis monitoring database
The Tacis projects have performed well in terms
of outputs and effectiveness. A Tacis monitoring
database was constructed for the purpose of this
evaluation. The database contains information on
481 completed and 530 ongoing projects. This
sample represents some 50 per cent of all
projects initiated by Tacis, covers 55 per cent of
the total value of the Tacis budget and accounts
for 75 per cent of all projects with budgets larger
than 300,000 ECU. The database allows the
Evaluation Team to draw conclusions which are
representative of the total Tacis project portfolio.
80 per cent of Tacis projects are seen as having
achieved their planned outputs. 20 per cent of
Tacis projects failed to achieve expected outputs,
either in part or in full.
71 per cent of Tacis projects are seen as having
performed in a manner termed “good” (30 per
cent) or “positive” (41 per cent) in terms of
achieving their targeted objectives. In 22 per cent
of the cases, the effectiveness of the projects has
been disappointing. A further 7 per cent must be
considered outright failures when measured
against these criteria.
87 per cent of Tacis projects are seen as having
been well targeted at the needs of the selected
partner organisations and/or beneficiaries. This is
the main factor explaining the performance of the
programme. In terms of sustainability of
achievement, the data show that it is reasonable
to expect that, in 75 per cent of Tacis projects,
positive impact has been achieved in terms of PO
capacity building, holding out the prospect of
positive impact on economic performance in the
future.
The Tacis experience of contractor performance
has in general been positive. The performance of
16 per cent was found to be below standard or
bad; the performance of 31 per cent was found to
be generally positive; the performance of 53 per
cent was assessed as good or excellent.
The commitment of the POs (defined here as NIS
project partners and users of project outputs) to
the project objectives and their actual
participation in, and contribution to,
implementation emerges from the evaluation as
the single most important factor relating overall
project performance to project effectiveness, and
the single most important factor of failure.
Results vary per sector. The effectiveness of
Tacis projects has been highest in the following
sectors: financial services, non-nuclear energy,
training and telecommunications. The level of
effectiveness has been satisfactory but somewhat
lower in the other sectors. In sectors dealing with
new enterprise development (SME), restructuring
of privatised former state owned companies
(agriculture and industry) and public
administration reform, it is proving to be more
difficult than expected to achieve reform-oriented
project objectives and to achieve impact in the
short time-frame typical for Tacis projects.
Results also differ from country to country.
Records indicate that Tacis achievements are on
average highest in Armenia, Russia and Georgia,
and lowest in Belarus, followed by Azerbaijan and
Tadjikistan.
These findings show that a positive relation exists
between Tacis performance in the NIS and the
NIS track record in terms of market-oriented
reforms. This finding supports the Preamble in
the Tacis Council Regulations which states that
“such assistance will be fully effective only in the
context of progress towards free and open
democratic systems that respect human rights,
and towards market oriented economic systems”.
Tacis assistance can also be useful in countries
with a poor record on market reforms and
democracy and civil rights. Tacis prjects in the
field of information and training can support the
building of reform-oriented attitudes and can in
due course have a positive impact on the re-
emergence of democratic, reform-oriented politics
and policies.
Impact
The Evaluation Team cannot on the basis of the
work done in this Tacis Interim Evaluation draw
authoritative conclusions concerning the global
impact of the Tacis Programme in terms of its
contribution to the content and pace of market
economy oriented reforms and support of
democracy. The programme is still too young and
indeed too dynamic to enable a full scale ex-post
evaluation to be made; and it is widely recognised
that no valid impact assessment methodology
exists for know how transfer programmes.
To give content to the concept of impact, the
Evaluation Team has defined impact in terms of:
(i) attitude change; (ii) policy change; (iii) public
and private sector institution building; ( iv)
training; (v) contributions to welfare, supporting
democracy and civil society and (vi) side effects.
Main insights gained are summarised below:
Attitude change.
One main strength of Tacis lies in its people to
people approach. Tens of thousands of NIS
managers, experts, administrators (and some
politicians) have met their EU counterparts. They
work jointly on NIS problems that have arisen in
the wake of the collapse of the former Soviet
Union. These anticipate the restructuring
demands which the transition to new market
oriented forms makes on NIS public and private
sector organisations, as well as on the individuals
in top, middle and lower management levels. This
joint work gives a wider view, leading to a better
and in-depth understanding of the problems,
which evidently makes it easier to find
appropriate solutions to meet new demands.
Policy change.
Throughout the NIS Tacis was in many sectors
the first major donor to address policy change
issues. In 1991-1992 Tacis had influence; TIE
interviews in 1997 with senior government
officials and policy makers confirm that without
Tacis support the development of policy-making
and implementation would have developed more
slowly in a number of key sectors including new
legislation, deregulation of markets, privatisation
instruments, enterprise restructuring
methodologies, trade and customs; and nuclear
safety. In recent years Tacis impact on the
decision-making process by which policy is
changed, and on budget allocations for
implementation, has been less successful than
was anticipated and planned. This is in part
explained by the lack of a sustained high level
policy dialogue between the Commission and the
NIS Governments and the usually limited access
of project staff and project policy papers to NIS
decision-making.
Institution building.
The large majority of the projects (87%) have
generally been well targeted at the needs of the
selected partner organisations and/or
beneficiaries. The data indicate that in 75% of
Tacis portfolio, NIS staff abilities increased and
the POs developed new capacity for dealing with
the problems addressed, to the extent that one
may expect that this will have a positive impact
on their future economic performance. Tacis
impact was greatest when it targeted the needs of
new private and public sector institutions and the
new capabilities needed by existing institutions:
migration policy, customs, taxation, small and
medium enterprises centres, commercial and
central banking, employment services, etc. In the
field of restructuring of existing organisations,
resistance to change has so far limited Tacis
impact.
Training.
The evidence shows that training can be
considered the most important and most
appreciated form of Tacis assistance. The impact
from the range of training activities is large.
Management training is found to be one of the
more successful tools for policy support. Tacis
contributed to the emergence of public and some
viable private sector training centres. Experience
of workshops and study tours proved highly
valuable for supporting the attitude change
processes.
The impact on education policies can not yet be
assessed. Concrete results were also achieved in
training of trainers, and curricula development.
Democracy, civil society, welfare and
environment.
The evaluators consider that so far the content of
the Tacis Programme has not reflected the fact
that reinforcing democracy is one of the two
principal Tacis Programme objectives; nor does it
present an adequate response to the practical
importance of third pillar issues as defined in the
Maastricht Treaty (justice and home affairs). A
comprehensive strategy for dealing with
democracy issues is conspicuously absent.
Nevertheless the evaluation shows that the
impact of Tacis on democracy in the NIS extends
beyond that of the relatively few projects started
up under the Tacis democracy programme. The
evaluators conclude that in most sectors Tacis
projects contribute to attitude changes or
institutional capacity development which has a
positive significance in the support of democracy.
On welfare issues, Tacis was one of the first
donors dealing with the provision of services
through NGOs, the transfer of social security
responsibilities from the privatised industries to
the public sector and the social consequences of
sector- and enterprise-restructuring. Tacis impact
in promoting environmental awareness among its
project partners is found to be very low.
Side effects.
Tacis has lowered the threshold for EU business
and consultancy companies setting up offices in
the NIS, and has provided a significant incentive
for the development of domestic consultancy
capacity in the NIS. In addition a rough estimate
indicates that some 40% of overall Tacis finance
are directly spent on NIS goods and services. The
other 60% consist mainly of the fees for EU
experts who provide their services in and for the
benefit of the partner states.
The evaluators conclude that Tacis is more
than the sum of its project results.
On the basis of the available monitoring
evidence, the workshops, and interviews one can
conclude that Tacis has had an impact on a
number of change processes which are important
for the further evolution of market economy and
democracy in the NIS and Mongolia.
Transparency
The Tacis information programme is only partly
successful. It has provided high quality
information to EU business on Tacis
programming and tendering opportunities.
Translated into Russian, this information is
available in the NIS only through the offices of
the Tacis Co-ordination Units and the few
Delegations. The general public in the NIS has
little appreciation or understanding of Tacis. The
news of failure spreads more easily than the news
of success. The image of Tacis in the NIS is less
positive than one would expect on the basis of the
findings of this evaluation.
A seriously prepared and sustained information
campaign presenting the positive side of Tacis to
the general NIS public seems to be needed. It
should show that Tacis is providing know-how
free of charge and should explain why; it should
provide Tacis with a clear profile compared with
other multilateral and bilateral donors.
Project cycle management and
staffing issues
Tacis has established a well defined and
transparent set of tools and procedures for project
design and implementation management
purposes in areas such as project identification,
project formulation, tendering and contracting,
project implementation and progress reporting by
contractors, implementation monitoring and final
reporting and invoicing. However, implementation
efficiency can be improved by utilising the project
management and implementation tools and
procedures consistently and better.
Not enough staff resources have been allocated
to Tacis to enable the operational units of DG1A,
at headquarters and in the field, to utilise their
project management tools and procedures to their
full potential. This is a main cause for the
inefficiencies outlined. This problem can only be
solved by the allocation of additional posts to
allow an extension of the Commission delegation
network to cover all the NIS, and to ensure that
staffing levels at headquarters are at least
comparable to those of other national and
international agencies.
The feedback of information and lessons learned
concerning the appropriateness of programming
and project implementation performance has
been limited, both within the Commission
services and the Tacis Management Committee.
A systematic review of experience gained has
been absent; thus the new programming rounds
and the selection and design of new projects have
benefited only to a limited extent from the
considerable experience in transition issues
developed within the Tacis Programme.
The establishment of the Tacis evaluation unit
and its start of operations in January 1997 can be
considered as positive; both evaluation and
monitoring systems should be reviewed to ensure
their development into an effective management
tool.
Legal basis and accountability
Criticism from the NIS and elsewhere points to
the slowness of Tacis and questions its cost-
effectiveness. This should be treated as a
warning to the Commission and EU institutions
which provide the Tacis institutional setting: a
warning not to create an ever more mature
bureaucratic system at the expense of cost
effectiveness.
In response to that criticism, it should be noted
that some NIS render the legal basis of Tacis
operations in their country uncertain, undermining
performance and forcing the contractors to
protect themselves by high contract pricing. The
Commission’s general rules and procedures as
formulated in the Financing Memoranda on Tacis
support measures are not formally agreed
between the EU and certain NIS. As a result, the
rights and obligations which are specified in the
contracts between the Commission and its Tacis
contractors are not recognised in some countries
where national laws are increasingly being
applied to Tacis contracts.
Conclusion
The evaluation shows that the Tacis Programme
can be credited with a moderate degree of
success in terms of realised outputs and
effectiveness in achieving the intended objectives
and impact. The report contains some
conclusions and recommendations which aim at
further increasing the overall relevance of the
programme; their implementation might also
contribute to improving the public image of the
Tacis Programme at home and abroad.
Part 1 – The Tacis Programme
Chapter 1  The Historical Setting
The period between 1989 and 1991 was a period
of amazement and shock, combined with a
feeling of relief and great hope of changing the
world into a better place. After 40 years of
building up an unprecedented nuclear strike
capability, which absorbed huge amounts of funds
from both the former USSR and NATO, the so-
called Cold War came to an end.
During this momentous time, the European
Council met in Dublin (July 1990) and Rome
(December 1990) where it was decided to support
the authorities of the former Soviet Union in their
efforts to bring about economic reform and
recovery. It paved the way for what is now known
as the Tacis Programme. “The programme shall
mainly take the form of technical assistance in
support of the economic reform in progress in the
partner States for measures aimed at bringing
about the transition to a market economy and
reinforcing democracy” (Tacis Financial
Regulation 19961, No 1279/96, of 25 June 1996).
With the collapse of the Soviet Union as a
political entity in December 1991, the centrally
planned economy, which had begun to falter in
the Brezhnev era, broke down further. The
resulting economic crisis deepened; inter-NIS
trade volumes dropped dramatically.
In the period 1991-1996, the external
environment in which the Tacis Programme is
placed, deteriorated in many areas. Organized
crime and problems of law and order emerged as
serious in the NIS, acting as a disincentive to
foreign investment and the emergence of new
businesses. These issues are only now beginning
to be addressed by the Commission in a
systematic way.
Despite macro-economic stabilisation, the
investment climate in the NIS countries has not
improved significantly. Foreign investment flows
to the NIS contrast strongly with those to the
Phare countries. Other societal conditions,
including those of health, social security,
education and poverty, have deteriorated.
Populations have become increasingly weary of
supporting their governments and their reform
programmes. These are factors which assistance
programmes, amongst them Tacis, can do little to
influence. The dynamics of macro-economic
conditions are presented in Table 1.1 below. For
                                           
1 Over time, the Council has approved three
Regulations pertaining to Tacis. The latest
Regulation covers the period 1996-1999.
all of the indicators, the 1991 index of 100 is
used. The table shows the severity of the
economic depression in the NIS. In a few
countries, including Georgia and Armenia,
economic recovery seems to have started. For
Russia, the deepest point of the depression might
have been reached and the beginning of a
recovery is predicted for 1997-98.
Figure 1 Macroeconomic indicators of NIS countries in 1996 (1991=100)
GDP Industrial
output
Gross
agricultural
output (all
types of
firms)
Fixed
capital
investment
(all sources
of financing)
Freight
traffic
volume
(excluding
pipelines)
Retail
turnover of-
officially
registered
enterprises
Consumer prices
index, times
Azerbaijan 43 42 55 97 14 11 13,465
Armenia 62 51 125 4 1 4 44 26,428
Belarus 65 62 79 33 20 49 39,624
Georgia 29 23 111 3 2 8 1 15 ...
Kazakhstan 56 49 60 11 20 21 21,610
Kyrgyzstan 58 36 68 56 5 41 3 941
Moldova 43 46 64 14 10 17 1,466
Russia 61 51 65 30 25 88 3 2,177 4
Tadjikistan 53 5 40 42 25 6 5 2 15,363
Turkmenistan 73 71 174 2 64 26 1 4,237 1
Ukraine 47 52 69 23 21 35 42,464 4
Uzbekistan 83 104 84 56 68 79 3 4,296 6
1 = 1994; 2 = 1993; 3 = Sold through all the channels; 4 = December 1991 to December 1996; 5 = In % to 1992; 6 = 1995
Source: The Russian Economic Barometer, Vol VI, no 1/1997, Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute for World Economy and International
Relations
Chapter 2 Tacis in the context of Official Development
Assistance
2.1 Size
The Tacis Programme operates as one of the
world’s many Official Development Assistance
(ODA) programmes. In recent years, ODA has
been subjected to a number of forces, which have
had their impact on the Tacis Programme. There
are overall fiscal restraints, which result in budget
pressures, there is a greater demand for
accountability and transparency of programmes
and many donors have shifted increasingly away
from project to programme aid (budget
assistance, balance of payments support or
export credits). Finally, both governments and
public opinion are demanding that aid
contributions be used “more effectively”,
reflecting concern with the poor overall results of
ODA in the 1970s and 1980s, especially in Africa.
Figure 2.1 presents overall official aid flows to the
NIS in the period 1990-95, including official
credits. Technical assistance, hereafter referred
to as TA2, represents only 4.9 per cent of these
flows. The Tacis Programme is the largest
provider of TA, representing 35 per cent of total
TA or 1.7 per cent of total official aid to the NIS.
Within the NIS, Russia is by far the largest
recipient of both ODA and technical assistance,
receiving 16.4 per cent of the total EU-ODA and
43.4 per cent of the EU’s TA.
                                           
2 Technical assistance involves development aid in which
transfer of knowledge and skills is the main goal. In OECD
terminology, technical assistance is referred to as technical
co-operation (TC). TA will be used as the abbreviation in the
rest of the text.
Figure 2.1. Total official aid to NIS, 1990-95
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It should be noted that over the period September
1990 to end 1995, the EU is the largest donor to
the NIS. The European Community provided ECU
5.1 billion. The Member States provided ECU
67.6 billion. Germany leads in this context.
Following Reunification, Germany provided the
former Soviet Union with export credits (ECU 21
billion); it also finances the bulk of the strategic
assistance for the withdrawal of Soviet forces and
the destruction of strategic missiles. Tables 2.2
and 2.3. show the type of support by donor.
Figure 2.2. Official aid to the NIS by Type of Support and Donor, 1990-95
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Figure 2.3. Technical assistance by donor to the NIS, 1991-95 (MECU)
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2.2 The Importance of Technical
Assistance
In recent years, technical assistance has been
widely criticised by the donor community. In
reaction to calls from many quarters, including the
OECD, for more effective use of technical
assistance funds, donors, including the EU, have
engaged in extensive monitoring and self-
evaluation of their activities.
Some of the lessons learned about TA in the NIS
from Tacis country evaluations, the European
Court of Auditors and the World Bank can be
summarised as follows:
the need for long term TA support in nearly all
NIS countries
the importance of country-specific attributes in
technical assistance planning
the necessity of involving recipients in TA project
planning from the start
the need for stricter conditionality of support
it is not advisable to directly finance government
agencies under restructuring
the need for temporary budget support whilst tax
and budget systems are being overhauled
the need for support to NGOs and the private
sector.
Technical assistance is a complex field. It has
become even more exacting in the light of
evidence that institutional and capacity
development are essential if the countries being
supported are going to succeed in their
development. It is hardly surprising that these
themes are now seen by donors as being the
main focus for their TA over the next decade.
Neither area is without its pitfalls and it must be
realised that successful TA in these areas has to
be seen as a long-term rather than a short term
undertaking.
In the NIS, the context of TA is even more
complex than in the developing countries,
because knowledge of both donors and recipients
is limited both in time and substance. Most
observers would argue, for example, that
transition goes beyond traditional development
and thus requires much more skills and time to be
able to provide well-tailored support. This is why
the World Bank specifically says that the scale
and extent of change in transition economies
makes problems of other reform programmes
“pale into insignificance”.
2.3 The Rationale of Tacis
In 1990, the European Council acknowledged that
the economic transformation of the former Soviet
Union would, in the coming decades, require
thousands of billions of ECU for investments in
infrastructure, education and industrial
restructuring. They also realised that the grant
funds available for assisting the reform process in
the former Soviet Union would represent no more
than a drop in the ocean if used for financial
assistance and/or direct investments in
infrastructure or productive capacity. Investment
requirements of this size can only come directly
from private sector investors (NIS and foreign),
from Public Sector Investment Programmes
financed indirectly by the NIS private sector via
tax revenues, or from a much larger – Marshall
Plan scale – international development effort.
Fully aware of this, the Council of Ministers of the
EU opted for technical assistance as one of its
first instruments for supporting the economic
reform processes in the former Soviet Union.
When Tacis was set up, a choice was made for
short-term interventions (18-24 month contracts)
rather than long term development-type aid
projects. At that time the Soviet Union was
considered to be a developed economic giant
which needed revitalisation and relatively short-
term, transition-oriented interventions were
considered more suitable than long-term,
development aid-type interventions. With
hindsight, it is clear that the complexity of change
in the NIS was grossly underestimated.
Chapter 3 Tacis Objectives and Programme
Description
3.1 Objectives
In 1991, the Tacis Regulation mentioned one
main objective: “the transition to a market
economy”. In the 1993 Regulation, the phrase
“and thereby reinforcing democracy” was added.
In recognition of the fact that ugly forms of
capitalism were developing which seemed to
need stronger forms of democratic guidance and
control, the 1996 Regulation put equal weight on
both objectives which are now formulated as:
“transition to a market economy and reinforcing
democracy”.
“In those countries where the formal legal
framework is a reality but, not respected or
effectively upheld, then such monopolies belie
the label ‘democratic and civil society’. More open
and stable societies facilitate successful trade.
Industry and commerce need security and
stability as a basis for business. This requires an
acceptance of rights and obligations within a legal
framework that is part of a civil society.” (Quote
from the NIS-wide paper on Democracy and Civil
Society.)
Programming is based on the overall objectives
as laid down in the Financial Regulations.
However, the 1991 and 1993 Regulations do not
provide an implementation strategy for achieving
the Tacis objectives. Instead, they identify a
number of indicative areas eligible for Tacis
support – commonly referred to as the Tacis
Priority Sectors – and mention that the
programme should:
· enable the establishment of conditions
favourable to private investment;
· encourage the development of (NIS) inter-
state economic links and trade flows;
· encourage the dialogue between the social
partners (in NIS states).
In the 1996 Regulation, two important changes
were introduced to guide future programming.
The Tacis Programme was given a supporting
role in the context of the Partnership and Co-
operation Agreements between the EU and the
various NIS. Secondly, Tacis was given the
flexibility to use part of its funds (10 per cent) for
investment purposes. Democracy appeared in the
form of a conditional statement. The Council
Regulation states that
a limited amount of the country financial
allocation should be used for small-scale
infrastructure projects in the context of cross-
border cooperation;
the development of small and medium-size
enterprises (SME) being a priority, equity funding
for SMEs should be provided by means of
support for establishing joint ventures;
“when an essential element for the continuation of
co-operation through technical assistance is
missing, in particular in the case of violation of
democratic principles and human rights, the
Council may, on a proposal from the
Commission, acting on a qualified majority,
decide upon appropriate measures concerning
assistance to a partner state” (art. 3.11).
3.2 Description of the Tacis
Programme
Programming instruments
Tacis has three main delivery mechanisms for its
assistance: the national programmes, the regional
programmes and the framework programmes or
facilities.
The national programmes absorb some 60 per
cent of the funds. They are programmed on the
basis of multi-annual Indicative Programmes
(IPs) and annual or bi-annual Action Programme
(APs). The Coordinating Unit (CU), established in
each country for the purpose of liaison between
the NIS government and the Commission, play a
central role in this process. The CU forms the
secretariat for the Tacis National Co-ordinator,
who is often a government member at deputy
minister level. It is the European Commission’s
main negotiating partner for the purpose of
programming Tacis financial resources. In those
countries where there is no Delegation of the
Commission, the CUs have a liaison or
representative function for the Commission, with
supportive tasks in project portfolio management.
In addition, the CUs have supervisory tasks, not
clearly defined, regarding the performance of
partner organisations (POs) and contractors
during project implementation. In CUs that have a
national Director, EU experts are attached. Their
purpose is to facilitate this intermediary function
and keep the Commission informed concerning
Tacis project performance and relevant external
factors.
The European Commission has established
Delegations in four out of the thirteen NIS
countries: Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and
Georgia. In these countries, the role of the CU
has become more limited and its significance for
the Commission now lies mainly in negotiating
the programming cycle with partners. The CUs
have the specific task of co-ordinating the
process of collecting the applications for Tacis
support from public and private sector
organisations and consolidating them into what
the Commission Services refer to as “demand
driven proposals” for the IPs and APs. These two
documents are the main products of the
programming process.
The identification and selection of regional
programmes is conducted annually in a joint
meeting of NIS Coordinating Unit representatives.
This meeting is chaired by the Commission and,
in principle, a unanimous decision on the project
proposals is required. This decision process has
proved to be increasingly difficult, because of the
different interests and political weights of the NIS
members.
Currently, the Commission operates some 20
different Tacis facilities. The facilities have in
common that they were developed to meet a
specific type of assistance need or to serve a
specific target group. A number of them can meet
the demands for assistance more quickly than in
the case of the national and regional
programmes. With only a few exceptions, the size
of the project interventions financed under the
umbrella of the facilities is substantially smaller
than 300,000 ECU. The management of the
facilities differs from the management of the
national and regional programmes. For most of
them, framework contracts have been awarded
for their management. The main ones are EES
(European Expertise Service), ESSN (European
Senior Expert Service Network), LIEN,
Democracy, Bistro, FFTF, ACE, INTAS, ISTC,
Productivity Initiative and Tempus.
Know-how transfer tools
The tools for transferring know-how have
gradually changed over time. The original
instruments were of four basic types: (i) policy
advice; (ii) institution building; (iii) design of legal
and regulatory frameworks; and (iv) training.
Building on experience and aiming to establish a
greater Partnership and Co-operation between the
EU and the NIS, a number of new instruments
were developed:
policy advice via advisory and consultancy
teams, studies and training
developing and reforming legal and regulatory
frameworks, institutions and organisations
setting up partnerships, networks, twinning and
pilot projects.
Actors in the Programme
Apart from the Commission services, the main
actors in the programme are:
· the National Co-ordinator: a representative of
the national NIS government, usually the
Minister or Deputy Minister of Economic or
Foreign Affairs;
· the Coordinating Unit (CU): representative
organisation of the national NIS government;
· the Partner Organisation or project partner: the
organisation receiving assistance in the form
of a project;
· the Contractor: a European firm implementing
a project;
· the Task Manager: a permanent or fixed-term
staff member of the European Commission,
responsible for managing a number of
contracts;
· the EC Delegation: representing the European
Commission abroad;
· the Monitoring Team: consisting of a European
and a local expert, responsible for monitoring
projects in the field.
Chapter 4  Tacis Funding
Since the start of the Tacis Programme in 1991,
the European Union has allocated growing
amounts of funds to the programme. The
absolute level of allocations increased from 375
MECU in 1991 to 560 MECU in 1996/97. This
high growth also indicates an increase of Tacis
funding in real terms (that is, corrected for
inflation). During the period 1991-1996, the
programme as a whole was allocated ECU 2.8
billion.
4.1. Size and distribution of funds
The importance of Tacis funding for the recipient
countries, as a percentage of GNP, is shown in
Figure 4.1. On average, funds allocated in the
period 1991-96 represent an equivalent of 0.12
per cent of 1995 GNP. In GNP terms, Tacis funds
are unevenly allocated across the recipient
countries. The highest allocations go to Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Mongolia, amounting to some 0.4
per cent of GNP. On the other hand, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and
Uzbekistan, receive less than 0.05 per cent of
GNP.
Figure 4.1. Importance of Tacis funding for recipient countries
Tacis assistance as % of GNP
(average contracted 1991-96/GNP 1995)
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
A
rm A
ze B
e
l
G
e
o
K
a
z
K
y
r
M
o
l
M
o
n
R
. 
Fe
d
T
a
d
T
u
r
U
kr
U
zb
T
a
ci
s
On average, Tacis TA, excluding regional
programmes, was equivalent to 1 ECU per capita
per year. The highest allocations per capita can
be found in Armenia, Georgia and Moldova.
Russia also receives just above the average, as
shown in Figure 4.2. It shows that, in per capita
terms, a fairly equitable distribution per country
has been pursued.
Figure 4.2. Tacis allocations per capita (excluding regional programme)
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The original country allocations were determined
in 1992. Since then, the allocations have been
influenced by the following factors. Russia’s share
has been maintained above average, which
reflects its political weight and its relatively
positive reform record. The last factor also
explains the high allocations to Armenia, Georgia
and Moldova, which were considered to be ‘good’
Tacis partners. Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tadjikistan
and Uzbekistan received relatively low allocations
on account of their poor reform track record.
Geopolitical influences have also played a role.
When the EU will be enlarged, it will share
borders with Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. The
EU’s economic interests in oil reserves in the
Caspian Sea area are also an important
consideration. In Tadjikistan, and recently in
Belarus, the allocations were significantly reduced
because of political considerations.
Figure 4.3.: Tacis funding by country (% of total)
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Both Inter-state and ‘Other’ projects receive a relatively high share of funds. These categories include such
items as Nuclear safety (17 per cent), Facilities (4 per cent) and financing via the EBRD. Since a high
proportion of Inter-state and Other projects is used, in practice, by the Russian Federation and Ukraine, the
total share of these two countries in the total Tacis financing is higher than shown in Figure 4.3.
4.2. Tacis funding by sector
The sectoral allocation of Tacis funds is
presented in Figure 4.4. It shows that, in the
period 1991-96,
Nuclear Safety attracted the highest allocation (17
per cent), followed by Support for Enterprises (14
per cent), Human Resources (12 per cent) and
Food Production and Distribution (10 per cent).
Figure 4.4. Sectoral allocation of Tacis funds (1991-96)
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The item ‘Other’ attracted 31 per cent and
included such activities as Humanitarian Aid, the
EBRD Bangkok facility, democracy initiatives and
other facilities.
Significant changes have occurred in the sectoral
allocation since the start of Tacis. Allocations to
Energy, Food Production and Distribution,
Support for Enterprises and Transport and
Telecommunication, which used to attract about a
half of all the funds in the years 1991-94,
decreased to 18 per cent in 1995 and 5 per cent
in 1996.
On the other hand, the share of Human
Resources and Nuclear Safety together,
increased from 14 per cent in 1991 to 27 per cent
in 1992 and to 37 per cent in the period 1994-96.
Also, the share of ‘Other’ is steadily increasing.
Human Resource Development is described in
the Tacis Financial Regulations as including
training, education, restructuring of public
administration, employment and social security,
strengthening of civic society, as well as policy
and legal advice.
Support for enterprises, or Enterprise
Restructuring and Development, covers
privatisation and restructuring of enterprises,
conversion of defence-related industries and
development of small and medium sized
enterprises.
4.3. Total allocation, contracting
and disbursement
Cumulative allocations, contracting and
disbursement are depicted in Figure 4.5. Annual
situations are shown in Table 4.1.
Figure 4.5. Cumulative Tacis funding (in MECU), 1991-96
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Table 4.1. Cumulative Tacis funding (in MECU), 1991-96
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Allocated 391 806 1276 1745 2256 2792
Contracted 391 806 1269 1706 2088 2196
Paid 357 716 1019 1256 1391 1412
Not yet
contracted
0.005 0.3 7 40 168 597
Not yet paid 34 90 250 450 697 784
% contracted 100% 100% 99% 98% 93% 79%
% paid 91% 89% 80% 74% 67% 64%
Table 4.1 shows that Tacis performance on
contracting has been satisfactory. The budget of
the programming years 1991-1993 has been fully
contracted. For programming year 1994, some 90
percent had been contracted by the end of 1996.
For 1995, this percentage is roughly 70 per cent.
For 1996, a smaller proportion of the allocation
had been contracted by the end of 1996. This
reflects the fact that the 1996 Annual Action
Programmes for Russia and Ukraine, and the bi-
annual Action Programmes for most of the other
partner states, were finalised and approved by the
Tacis Committee only in the third quarter of 1996.
This delay in programming has been a problem of
Tacis since the beginning. It has proved to be
very difficult to bring the programming cycle
forward.
A backlog of payments compared to contracting is
the normal state of affairs in the implementation
of aid programmes. The extent of the backlog,
however, has increased in the 1995-1997 period.
Disbursements for a Tacis Programme year now
require more than five years to be realised. This
appears excessively long, considering that most
contracts have a duration of only 18 to 24
months. At the end of May 1997, disbursements
from the 1996/97 allocations were still next to nil.
The impression of the Evaluation Team is that the
backlog of contracts and payments (and with it
the backlog of implementation of projects) has
increased substantially in the 1995-1997 period.
The delay in the approval of the new 1996
Financial Regulation, which superimposed
another layer of financial and tendering rules, on
top of those contained in the previous Financial
Regulation, and the consequent tightening of
contracting and payment procedures, seems to
account for this.
Table 4.2.: Contracts by size
Description Number of components Total value (x 1,000 ECU)
Number % of total Amount % of total
Value unknown 5 0
< 10,000 567 14 2.545 0
10,000 – 100,000 1.168 30 51.652 2
100,000 – 300,000 846 22 170.255 9
>= 300,000 1.338 34 1.890.056 89
Total 3.924 100 2.114.508 100
Table 4.2. shows contracts by size. More than
3,900 contracts have been prepared in the period
under review. Two thirds of these – 2,600 – were
small contracts constituting 11 per cent of the
total value of all contracts. For these, the
simplified procedured applied within the
framework contracts are used. One third of the
contracts concern service contracts for amounts
of 300 000 ECU or more, for which formal
tendering procedures are required3. In total these
acount for 89 per cent of the total value of all
Tacis contracts. The average value of these
larger contracts is 1.4 MECU.
                                           
3 The 1996 Council Regulation has further decreased the limit
for direct agreement contracts and restricted tendering
procedures to ECU 150,000 and ECU 200,000 respectively.
Part 2 -Findings on Tacis performance,
effectiveness and impact
Chapter 5  Appropriateness of Tacis programming and
the Tacis instruments
5.1 Introduction
A concise description of the programme is
presented in Chapters 2 and 3 of this report. In
this chapter, the performance of the Tacis
Programme is evaluated against the criteria of
appropriateness.
Terminology
Appropriateness: The degree of success of the
Commission in identifying and selecting those
issues for Tacis support which can be considered
to be the most urgent in terms of NIS priority
needs for TA, and the most suitable for TA, given
the Tacis mandate, the available know how in the
EU member states, and taking into account the
policies of the Commission and the EU towards
the NIS.
The evaluation has reviewed Tacis programming
performance and programming instruments at
three levels.
· at the macro level, where coherence between
the general NIS partner needs and EU policies
is expected;
· at the meso level, where IPs need to focus on
issues which are consistent with the Tacis
objectives and on the NIS partner country
needs for technical assistance (TA);
· at the micro level, where programming should
succeed in identifying and formulating projects
which are consistent with the Tacis objectives
set at the sectoral level and appropriate for the
organisations selected to be the project
partners.
5.2 The Macro Level
Three Council Regulation have set the framework
for the Tacis Programme. They have defined the
Commission’s objectives for the Tacis
Programme, the relative changes in these
objectives, and they have set the priority areas for
Tacis support to the NIS. As shown in section 2,
these Regulations gave little guidance on the
specific policy objectives and strategies which the
EU would like to pursue in the NIS.
The references made, in Council Regulations, to
investment promotion, intra-CIS trade and small
and medium enterprises are seen by the
evaluators as aiming to remove the “transaction
cost wall” that has become visible after the Iron
Curtain was lifted. The term “transaction cost
wall” stands for the many barriers that limit the
emergence of new commercial, trade and
investment relations between the NIS and the EU
market, the development of markets within the
NIS and the emergence of enterpreneurship
inside the individual NIS partner states. These
barriers are many.
Given the extensive nature of these barriers, the
choice of the European Union for directing its
grant aid funds towards the transfer of “know-
how” aiming, amongst other things, at removing
these transaction cost, rather than financial
assistance, can be assessed as the appropriate
choice.
The Indicative Programme for 1991 focused on a
limited number of priority sectors; food
distribution, energy, financial services, training
and transport. In the absence of a basic field
infrastructure for project identification and
selection, Tacis simply invited applications for
support from POs. Contractors were awarded
contracts without tendering. This approach was
very popular. Even today, some representatives
from the CU in Russia voiced the opinion that this
approach was better than the more elaborate,
demand-driven process which was subsequently
established. Their argument is that the quality of
the projects was higher because there were more
competing applications for support, compared to
the relatively small amount of funding available in
1991. The validity of this argument is difficult to
test. Monitoring data for projects in Russia for
different programming years do indicate that the
1991 and 1992 portfolio had a relatively high rate
of very good projects compared to projects from
the 1994 and 1995 programming years. On the
other hand, the number of projects that failed was
also higher in the early years.
The Indicative Programme for 1992 saw some
changes compared to 1991. The Baltic States
moved from Tacis to Phare and the individual
NIS countries became partner organisations for
Tacis. Co-ordinating Units were established and
supported by EU experts. Simultaneously, a
number of new initiatives emerged including
Nuclear Safety, EBRD Bangkok facility, ISTC,
and regional actions. The programming exercise
itself was elaborated by the fielding of consultant
teams who identified projects and wrote the draft
Action Programmes. Problems tackled under the
first two IPs included language barriers,
legislative barriers, unclear ownership rights and
administrative regulations concerning licensing
and investments and the promotion of bankers
training, to mention just a few.
During these years the programming was driven
by the indicative support areas identified by the
Council Regulations. These were used by the
Commission to organise its operational units on a
sector basis. A strong point in the first two years
of the programme was that, especially in the
smaller countries but also in Russia, the
Commission did target strategic people in the
reform process. In addition to a number of very
good projects which gave rise to follow-up
projects and continuity in programming in
subsequent years, studies to understand how to
transfer and what to transfer were dominant forms
of TA. The actual transfer of know-how itself was
secondary. Eager to learn how to meet the
demands of transition, recipient governments
became disillusioned with these “what to do”
studies. This disillusionment seems to have taken
root, and is often expressed by interviewees as
“consultant fatigue”. These studies have since
become part of the myths about Tacis.
Consultant Fatigue
“EU experts came to study our problems, they
asked us many questions, we provided many
answers, then they reported back to us which
problems we had and made some half-baked
recommendations in a report written in English
only and the projects were over. We hope the
study was useful for Tacis, it was not so for us.”
(Comment from a Belarussian interviewee on the
initial rail transport studies)
Clear market reform-oriented policy objectives for
the various sectors did not emerge in this period.
At the wider level of the European Union, a clear
policy on the future relations between the NIS and
the EU took time to develop. The assumption
behind the early direction of the programme was
that transition would be short-lived. When this
proved not to be the case, the programme
continued to expand in the second phase, post
1992, without review.
In the period covered by the 1993 Tacis Council
Regulation (1993-1995), a whole range of
changes took place in Tacis programming. These
included a widened scope of the programme with
the addition of the second objective on
democracy and the introduction of a number of
priority sectors. Inter-state projects and
geographical concentration areas were
introduced, as well as increased modalities of TA
delivery and a range of “facilities”, sub-
programmes in different fields. Many of the latter,
in fact, cut across various sectors. In the same
period, new Partnership and Co-operation
Agreements between the EU and individual NIS
countries were negotiated.
Thus, in barely one IP cycle, Tacis became a very
different programme from the one known to its
originators. In reviewing the general directions
and rapid changes at the macro level, the
Evaluation Team is of the opinion that the
programme moved from a relatively clear, early
market-reform oriented philosophy to a
technocratic machine. The present state of affairs
is that concepts are unclear, well-argued
philosophy is missing, rationalisations for changes
remain unexplained (none of these are written
down and fully justified) and the predominant EU
policies could be better formulated in operational
terms. As many interviewees have suggested, the
Tacis Programme became “a consultant affair”,
characterised by factors such as “many issues are
long-term”, “Partnership and Co-operation
agreements are central but need to be linked to
Regulations” and “instruments are complete but
there are too many of them”.
The latest Council Regulation covers the period
1996-1999. It further widens the scope of the
programme, raises “reinforcing democracy” as the
second programme objective, lists environment
as a new indicative area for support, introduces
the possibility to use an additional 10 per cent of
Tacis funding for investment-type support
measures and makes reference to the PCA
agreements.
Reviewing the various developments mentioned
above, the Evaluation Team concludes that there
has been limited follow-through in programming
activities and implementation of the two main
Tacis objectives (assisting transition and
reinforcing democracy). A comprehensive policy
for reinforcing democracy has been largely
absent and the content and level of Tacis support
for measures in this field has been very small
compared with, (a) the upsurge in uncivil society
experienced between 1991 and 1996 in the NIS
and (b) the importance of third pillar Home Affairs
and Justice issues in the relations between the
NIS and the EU. Likewise, a comprehensive
policy from the Commission on the use of Tacis
as an instrument for promoting market-oriented
economic reforms has not emerged. The implicit
objectives of removing the transaction costs,
which some senior officials in the Commission
perceive as the binding factor in Tacis
programming, have played a smaller role than
might have been expected given the PCA context
that was developed in 1994.
Another factor noted by the Evaluation Team is
that the expected benefits from the reorganisation
of the Commission directorate (DG1A/C)
responsible for Tacis, from a sectoral to a
geographic orientation, have not yet been fully
realised. This is shown, for example, by the fact
that policy papers, which were written during the
last two years by the Commission on the future
relations between the NIS and the EU have had
little influence on the actual content of Tacis
programming thus far.
Three factors may account for what appears to
the evaluators to be a policy vacuum. First, there
has been little continuity in the higher levels of
Commission management which, in turn, has left
plenty of scope for middle management to pursue
their own ideas about priorities. Secondly, in the
period after 1994, the delays in the ratification of
the PCAs and in the adoption of the 1996 Tacis
Financial Regulation have detracted from a clear
positioning of Tacis in the NIS. This is also true
for Tacis’ positioning relative to other multilateral
and bilateral donors working in the NIS. Thirdly,
Tacis adopted a demand-driven approach to
programming, which some senior officials argue
is an appropriate way for identifying the priority
needs of the Tacis Partner States. However,the
Evaluation Team observes that strategic planning
mechanisms which are required for an
appropriate demand-driven approach are not in
place in the NIS .
The evaluation team finds that, at the beginning
of the programme, the absence of a clear policy
framework was understandable. It could even be
argued that its absence created the flexibility
needed, at that time, to identify the priority needs
for technical assistance. However, the fact that in
1997, the Commission services still programme
Tacis in the absence of clear policies is
considered a weakness by the NIS programming
partners and by some senior staff members in the
Commission services concerned.
5.3 The Meso Level
At this level, where IPs and APs are formulated
under the guidance of the Tacis Country Co-
ordinators, the programme has struggled to keep
the number of priorities limited. Time and again,
programming guidelines have emphasised the
need for setting priorities, given limited Tacis
resources. In this respect, Tacis has only partly
succeeded. Despite the established objective of
providing support to transition issues, in practice,
the Tacis Programme also contains measures
which are targeted at long-term development
issues, measures for which resources are
categorically inadequate. Also, projects are, in
practice, targeted at a wide range of sectors.
In the view of the Evaluation Team, the
programme components at the meso level are
mostly very relevant to NIS partner needs. In
many cases it is not clear if programme
components are indeed linked to the transition
concept underlying the first Tacis Programme
objective. There is an increasing focus on
institutional development within projects, a focus
which steps beyond the objectives of supporting
transition and requiring resources which the Tacis
Programme, in its present form, is unable to
deliver. Similarly, the programme components do
not seem to pay much attention to the longer term
issue of democracy, which appears as a residual
allocation in programming. Thus, while the
programme components at this level are
responsive to NIS partner needs, they do not
sufficiently incorporate the objectives of the Tacis
Programme set at the macro level.
On the other hand, the evaluation team has found
consistency between APs and IPs. This indicates
that the programming between meso and micro
level is sufficiently co-ordinated.
The Tacis Programme is described as “demand-
driven”. However,the way in which Tacis identifies
demand can be questioned. There is no doubt
that needs outstrip supply of TA but how need
and demand are matched is almost impossible to
determine (in the absence of needs assessments)
and how these needs are prioritised (in the
absence of any government Public Sector
Investment Programme – PSIP) also poses a
problem. Intermingled with this issue is, of course,
a common problem reported frequently in this
evaluation, namely the lack of co-ordination of
donors. In all NIS countries except Kyrgyzstan,
where a PSIP has been introduced, this issue is
not addressed. Consequently, programming at the
AP level often results in overlaps with other
donors. One ministry in the Russian Federation,
for example, has 80 donor projects in the same
general area. A PSIP, or an equivalent budgetary
instrument, could ensure proper management of
TA funds.
At the same time, by accepting the project
selection choices made by the countries, without
applying more stringent requirements for meeting
Tacis’ primary objectives, the meso programming
level undermines macro level attempts at
strategic policy formulation. By taking a purely
reactive approach to the “demands” made by
countries, Tacis significantly weakens its ability to
deliver its own objectives.
Apart from the general weakness of IPs and APs
in showing direct linkage to the Tacis objectives,
the process of programming itself appears to be
weak. The national Coordinating Units (CUs) are
responsible for preparing the groundwork of
prioritisation. The CUs play a significant role in
communicating programme “demands” to Tacis
through their role in the project selection process.
It is the CUs’ responsibility to make the first
selection of project applications from those
submitted, and to forward this selection to the
Delegation. In many cases, it is not clear what
criteria are being applied within what guidelines.
The Delegation in Russia has developed a project
appraisal sheet in an attempt to regularise the
project selection process. Yet many questions
remain about the extent to which the process
reflects country priorities in a systematic way.
Although CUs carry significant responsibilities,
they generally lack any of the necessary
instruments to be able to carry them out. It is
quite clear from the expenditures on short term
contracts that consultants are used extensively to
assist in this process (29.5 MECU over the 91-96
period). Many CUs have problems with the
formalities of the process – as is the case with
NGOs at the other end of the scale when
tendering has to be done – and it would be wrong
to expect otherwise given the number of changes
they have had to accommodate in so short a
time. In particular, IP programming cycles have
been changed three times and AP cycles have
been changed twice in only four years, in large
part, a reflection of the long delay and uncertainty
prior to approval of the 1996 Financial
Regulations.
In interviews with the Evaluation Team, with the
exception of Russia, the Tacis National Co-
ordinators expressed their satisfaction with their
country’s influence on the content and
prioritisation of the Indicative and Annual
Programmes. The programmes were, in their
view, for a large part, demand-driven. Given their
role in initial project selection, this influence is
real. However, in Russia, the CU feels that this
influence is not so real at the more strategic
levels.
The programming for the Tacis inter-state
programme is structured differently. For this
programme, countries convene annually to review
progress and come to a common understanding
about resource allocations. The Commission
chairs these meetings. Over the last two years,
experience shows that it is becoming more
difficult to reach consensus on priorities, due to
the fact that different countries have different
internal economic structures and thus different
priorities for inter-state co-operation. If the
outcome of these negotiations was linked to
national programme budgeting then this might
improve the chances for consensus.
A large share of the Tacis resources, 36 per cent
between 1991-96, is spent on Regional
Programmes and Facilities. As a delivery
mechanism for Tacis, they share the feature that
they are designed to meet the needs of, or reach,
a specific target group better than would be the
case through a national or inter-state programme.
As to the relevance of these specific
programmes, this is often mentioned as being
dependent on the quality, or lack of it, of the
framework management arrangements. However,
be that the case or not, a systematic evaluation of
these sub-programmes is beyond the scope of
this study and so no valid comments can be
made here of individual framework programmes.
5.4 The Micro Level
Translating a Tacis Action Plan into operational
projects takes a significant amount of time, often
resulting in TOR which are inappropriate by the
time they are implemented. The evaluation team
has received a large amount of evidence
supporting this conclusion. The problem of
outdated TOR can be remedied at Inception
Report time (written within two to three months of
the start of the project) and the monitoring reports
confirm this is happening. However, in practice,
certain obstacles hinder a re-shaping of the TOR
during the inception phase. A major obstacle is
considerations regarding project duration. Given
that project duration is fixed normally between 18
months and 24 months and that the inception
phase lasts for the first 3 months of the project,
project activities must start immediately on
conclusion of the inception phase and any
significant changes to the TOR would jeopardise
this.
Standardised formulas for project length and
inputs also create problems. TOR rarely take an
unorthodox or innovative approach to problems,
evidenced by the lack of implementation of
longer-term solutions to longer-term problems, as
noted by the Evaluation Team. On the contrary,
many difficulties in contract extension are
evident. For example, changing contractors for
what seem to be phases of a larger project, are in
fact often only interruptions of the same project.
Not only is this change of contractors inefficient, it
is not always cost-effective unless there have
been severe problems with the contractors. The
evaluation, however, found little evidence of that.
Examined from another perspective, TOR which
over-specify activities and tasks can, in fact,
restrict flexibility in implementation. They can
also limit the identification of new approaches or
address issues which have become outdated.
A View on Programming
“The procedures for programming and planning
are far too long in Tacis. For example, projects
are planned in 1994 and by budget year 1995,
they are not yet started. This has serious
consequences, recipients lose interest and the
TOR become outdated.” (a CU Director)
In the programming at the micro level, the CU
proposes certain parties as project partners (PO).
These then need to be approved by Tacis. Tacis
hires consultants to prepare the TOR and to
advise the TMs on the most suitable partner
organisation. The lack of partner involvement in
the TOR formulation is regretted by the
evaluation. This is the main activity which
provides “ownership” of projects, and which
contributes substantially to the development of
project partner commitment.
In some projects, the presence of several local
partners is considered by the evaluation to result
in higher risks to achieving results. A last issue
emerging from the evidence collected on partners
is that there appears to be a very limited
understanding by them of the different roles and
responsibilities of the different parts of the Tacis
administration.
Observations about the appropriateness of the
projects for the project partners (the extent to
which project partners judged the TA provided as
meeting their needs) are based on the Tacis
monitoring database (which will be described in
more detail in Chapter 6). The opinions of project
partners are available about completed projects.
These can be split by country and by sector. At
NIS-wide level, it can be noted that the
appropriateness has been assessed between
average and good. When looking at this level, it
should be noted that in the Russian Federation,
which accounts for 55 per cent of the projects,
appropriateness has been assessed above the
NIS-wide average. The Russian Federation thus
pushes up the appropriateness score for the
whole NIS population. On the other hand,
Kazakhstan represents the only case where the
score is substantially below the average NIS-wide
level. However, since Kazakhstan only accounts
for about 4 per cent of the completed projects, the
bias introduced by this country is not significant.
5.5 Discussion and Conclusions
The main observations of the Evaluation Team
are the following.
The Council Regulations of 1991 and 1993 set a
workable framework for the evolution of the Tacis
Programme. The 1996 Regulation is adequate
and flexible enough for the period 1996-1999.
The Regulation identifies indicative support
areas, but is not an instrument which gives
guidance on the policy objectives and strategies
which the EU and the Commission wishes to
pursue in the priority sectors. It has, however,
superimposed a new layer of financial and
procedural control.
Technical assistance in the form of transfer of
know-how is very much needed in the NIS and
Mongolia. The Evaluation Team concludes that,
at the present time, the provision of technical
assistance rather than financial assistance is
appropriate.
The EU/Tacis Programme has lacked a clear
identity with respect to the specific policy
objectives in the countries and priority fields
identified for support. In 1991, it was
understandable that such an overall view on
assistance needs and on the specific contribution
which the EU could offer was not well developed.
In 1997, this absence is perceived, by both the
partner states and by Commission staff in the
operational units of DG1A, to be a major
weakness. Moreover the content of the policy
documents which the Union and the Commission
have prepared in recent years on the future
relations between the NIS and the EU and on the
integration of the NIS in the world economy, are
not yet fully reflected in the IPs and APs for the
NIS.
Considering that the PCAs are expected to be
fully ratified by the end of 1997, and that the
Interim Agreements on Trade are already in
force, the evaluators would expect to see these
documents providing more focus in Tacis
programming.
A relatively high proportion of the Tacis budget,
and staff time has been spent on programming to
better understand the priority needs of the NIS. A
system of multi-annual Indicative Programmes
has evolved, supplemented by annual
programmes in the case of Russia and Ukraine
and bi-annual programmes for the remaining
partner states. The Commission Services refer to
this as “the Tacis demand-driven approach”
because it involves a consultation process which
starts with a summary paper on applications for
support compiled by the Partner state authority
dealing with Tacis, the National Co-ordinators and
the CU secretariat. This system does serve its
purpose, yet it is time- and resource-intensive.
The appropriateness of the outcome of this
planning process cannot be fully assessed, due to
the absence of an overall system for identifying
priority needs.
As the PCAs come into force, this might be the
right time to replace the demand-drive approach
by a dialogue-driven approach. Such a dialogue
would need, first, a clear position from the
Commission on the policy objectives it wants to
pursue with the EU /Tacis Programme in the
selected priority areas. Secondly, it would need
an improved process on NIS side for identifying
and setting the priorities for multilateral and
bilateral assistance in general, and for Tacis
assistance in particular. The current system of
involving CUs as facilitators for mobilising the
needs in partner states and for ensuring donor co-
ordination on the recipient side has practical
merit, but falls short when compared with the
practice of a Public Sector Investment
Programme (PSIP) as applied by the Phare
programme in the Baltic States, linked with Public
Expenditure Reviews (PERs).
In 1992, the basic pattern for the allocation of
Tacis budget allocation per country was fixed.
Subsequent changes over time can be considered
as having been based on sound decisions: the
reform track record, aid absorption capacity and
geopolitical factors including political weight and
EU economic interests have influenced the
allocations.
The changes in the sector allocations by and
large reflect the evolution of new policy priorities
in the NIS. In some cases such as SMEs,
proactive policy from the EU side shaped the
sector allocations.
At the micro level, the programming has
functioned reasonably well in the sense that, in
general, the projects are well targeted on issues
which are considered appropriate by the partner
organisations. Problems arise from the detailed
planning level where it is found that TORs are
often prepared without sufficient consultations
with the PO, the PO selection process has
weaknesses and the time gap between project
identification and the arrival of the contractor in
the field takes too long. The monitoring data
base, for projects which are in the inception
phase, shows that, in a notable share of the
projects, these weaknesses contribute to TORs
being outdated (19%) and to the need for
adjusting project strategies compared with the
strategies proposed by the contractors in their
technical proposals (35 per cent).
An issue the importance of which is not fully
recognised yet is that the Tacis Programme is not
sufficiently oriented towards visible
results/outcomes. Rather, it is mainly oriented
towards positively changing the abilities of POs.
This is fine, but it is not enough. When asked
what they consider the best Tacis projects, the
CUs invariably point to those projects which show
concrete visible, demonstrable outputs: for
example, the food chain shops in Minsk,
employment agencies and the Economic Trends
publications, to mention just a few. These are
needed to justify to the public and to the
Parliament what has happened with the Tacis
moneys. The evaluators suggest that the
Commission ensures project choices which
deliver visible results for all concerned. Finally,
the evaluators recommend the promotion of
PSIP, strategic planning mechanisms, in the NIS
with the objective of creating an appropriate
framework for the future of Tacis.
Chapter 6  Effectiveness and Efficiency of
Implementation Performance
6.1 Introduction
The analysis presented here draws on a variety of
sources4 and presents the findings on the
effectiveness, efficiency and implementation
performance of the Tacis Programme
The chapter is divided into three parts. The first
part of the review focuses on the contributions
which Tacis has made to the reform process in
each of the main sectors of the NIS economies in
which it operates. Findings here are primarily
derived from sector reviews produced for this
evaluation. The second part presents statistics
from the Tacis monitoring data base on the
overall programme performance, on the
differences between the effectiveness of Tacis in
the various Partner States and on the differences
in effectiveness between the priority sectors on
an NIS-wide basis. In the third part, the findings
from the monitoring data base with respect to the
implementation efficiency of the Tacis
Programme (both as a whole and at the sector
level) are presented.
Terminology
Outputs: the planned deliverables/results
described in the TOR which the project should
produced before the end of the contract between
the Commission and the contractor.
Effectiveness: The extent to which the Tacis
partner organisations (POs) who receive the
assistance successfully utilise the project outputs
to achieve the project objectives. This implies
that the problems identified during project
selection as priorities for Tacis assistance are
either solved or control of them is improved.
Sustainability: The durability of project
achievements (effects) beyond the ending date of
Tacis project support.
                                           
4 (i) Interviews and workshops; (ii) the Tacis monitoring
database; and (iii) the six NIS-wide sector reviews prepared
for the Tacis Interim Evaluation: Human resource
development (HRD), Enterprise restructuring and
development (ERD), Infrastructure, transport and
telecommunications (T&T), Nuclear safety (NUC), Non-
nuclear energy (ENE) and Food production, processing and
distribution (F&A).
Efficiency: The degree to which the projects
realise their planned outputs within the time,
inputs and budget limitations set by the contract.
6.2 Review of the Tacis
contribution to sectoral reforms in
the NIS
Human Resource Development
During the period under review (the 1991-1996
programmes), about 323 MECU was allocated for
HRD5. The bulk of the support went to Education
and Training, which is a NIS-wide priority field for
Tacis. With respect to Education, the Tempus
programme (52 MECU from 1993 to 1995)
contributed to the introduction and adoption of
western curricula for university education in a
number of academic fields. General education
policy and primary education, on the other hand,
were not targeted for support. In the field of
Training, most assistance went to managerial and
manpower training programmes. To support
scientific research and to promote contacts
between scientists, separate framework
programmes were established, such as ACE and
INTAS. Within the framework programmes,
special reference should be made to the
International Science and Technology Centre
(ISTC) in Moscow (45 MECU). This programme
aims to provide weapons scientists and engineers
in the NIS with research opportunities allowing
them to redirect their knowledge towards non-
military purposes. The centre has been jointly
funded by the EU, the USA, Japan and the
Russian Federation since 1993.
“Among the various programs in place to deal
with the proliferation threat, the ISTC has been
modest in costs, relatively non-controversial and
successful ... while often described as an
organisation to prevent the emigration of Russian
weapons scientist to rogue states, the ISTC
cannot by itself prevent determined espionage.
Minimising the incentives for weapon scientists to
engage in activities that result in proliferation of
their knowledge and expertise is a realistic goal.
The ISTC has been successful in pursuing this
goal ... its grants have reached 12,000 scientists
                                           
5 In each of the following sector discussions, the figures used
for allocations at the start of each, do not include inter-state
and facilities allocations.
and engineers in five countries” (Quote from: An
assessment of the ISTC, by the National
Research Council (USA), 1996)
In the field of Public Administration Reform, Tacis
started with projects in Armenia, Belarus,
Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. At present, similar
projects are being implemented in all NIS. Many
projects are focused on general administrative
reform, the strengthening of public administration
schools, local government (Russia), statistics and
customs. Examples include the Federal Migration
Service in Russia and employment services in
both Belarus and Russia. Macroeconomic policy
and legal advice have been provided through the
European Expertise Service (EES) framework
contracts (36 MECU) since 1992. This was set up
as a quick response channel – avoiding Tacis
tendering procedures for individual interventions
– to handle requests from partner state
governments for high-level, short-term advice on
economic policy and institutional (re)design. In
Russia and Ukraine, social security/safety nets
and the transfer of social assets from privatised
companies to local governments are two
relatively new fields of attention for Tacis.
The evaluation finds that Tacis influence in
Education and Training has been positive. The
general public administration restructuring efforts
of NIS has been limited, although projects have
been influential in specific areas of this field. In
particular, the development of public
administration skills and the training of trainers
has been largely successful, although on a limited
scale. Given the difficulty of changing the strong
hierarchical structures and the management style
of the key decision-makers which remain firmly
rooted in the past, and until such officials are
retired and/or replaced, reform of the government
will prove to be very difficult and time-consuming.
The bulk of the money used in macro-economic
policy and legal advice is for funding teams of
resident advisors, and not for short term advisory
work. Elements of the programme are found to be
very useful. However, the contractors have not
succeeded in mobilising the demand from
member states at a high enough level of
government. The potential value of the
instrument thus remains under-utilised.
Consistent with other evaluations in the HRD
sector, this evaluation also finds that clearer,
more focused support with a realistic time-frame
and funding will yield more significant results than
broad scope interventions.
Strengthening primary health care and health
management in Moldova
The specific objectives of the project are to
develop nationally agreed action plans suitable
for (1) the actual development of primary health
care (PHC) during the next 3-5 years, (2)
strengthening health management during the next
3-5 years, and (3) developing an appropriate
nation-wide organisation of health services. Apart
from these action plans, the main outputs include
training needs assessments for undergraduates
and polyclinic specialists so that they qualify as
family doctors, revised curricula for a university
degree in PHC, and an assessment of the needs
and existing capacity for health management
training and organisation. The Ministry of Health
is committed to these reforms and was the main
driving force behind this project.
The project has both strong and weak elements.
The timing of the project was not ideal,
considering the presidential elections in early
1997 and the uncertainty of the outcome. This
has caused delays in the implementation of
activities. The new government of Moldova
supports the aims of the project. On the positive
side, two complementary projects are currently
being implemented (one WHO and one World
Bank project), providing for some continuity after
the end of the Tacis project. After an ineffectual
start in the inception phase, the contractor made
the appropriate decision to concentrate efforts on
a limited, specifically defined number of issues.
For the development of the action plans, two
Task Forces were established. Thereafter, an
increased number of people working in the health
sector became involved in the project. A recent
contract addendum provides an additional budget
for local experts, including those on the Task
Force, which will have a positive effect on
commitment.
Provided the specific objectives of the project are
achieved, this project can have a positive impact
on the implementation of measures to reform the
health care system, contributing to an enhanced
quality of health services and a higher cost-
effectiveness of their provision. The project is
behind schedule, and much remains to be done.
However, it might well be possible to catch up in
the remaining project period.
Staff Development and Training, Institute for
the Economy in Transition (IET-Russian
Federation)
The specific objective was to provide technical
assistance for the IET to enable it to undertake
high quality economic research in the context of
transition, informing government policy makers
on relevant economic policies and develop a
diversified publication programme (reports,
academic papers).
The project was amongst the first to be launched
by Tacis. It was timely in coinciding with IET’s
formative years, during which it developed an
international reputation for economic research
capability. At the start of the project, there was a
relatively long period of adaptation for the project
partners and adjustment of implementation
strategy. During the second year of the project,
the partners came to the conclusion that the best
method of developing research capacity is
through joint research. Although outside the TOR,
joint research was implemented. In order to
achieve radical changes in the IET, an Addendum
to the TOR was approved in mid-project,
providing additional resources and aimed mainly
at supporting a group of young senior
researchers. In the third year of the project, an
institutional restructuring of the IET took place. At
the end of the original project, a nine month
extension, without budget increase, was granted
and successfully used by the project partners.
The project has consistently met its objectives
and produced above average results. IET has
moved from the traditional descriptive approach
to economic problems towards an analytical
approach. The project has enabled IET to gain
prestige and international standing for its research
and faculty. There are no problems on
sustainability of the project’s results, as they are
already integrated into IET research. This case is
an example of a highly needed, well targeted and
timely technical assistance contribution.
Enterprise Restructuring and Development
Tacis has allocated about 387 MECU to this
sector in the period under review. It comprises
support for the development of small and medium
enterprises, conversion of defence-related
industries, privatisation and restructuring and
financial services. In 1991, Tacis started with a
financial services programme for the then Soviet
Union. In 1993, SME support and privatisation
were organised as separate programme
components within Tacis. In 1994 and 1995,
Military Conversion and Enterprise Restructuring
emerged as priorities. In 1996, POst-Privatisation
Centres were being established.
In the area of financial services, Tacis has made
a sizeable contribution to the development of
advisory services, vocational training centres for
staff of commercial banks and for the savings
banks in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. These
initiatives sowed the seeds for what is now “the
bank twinning facility”. In addition, Tacis was the
first donor to develop business plans with the NIS
head offices of the state banks and former state
banks, projects which have provided help in their
restructuring problems. In some countries, using
food aid counterpart funds, Tacis has helped to
establish agricultural credit banks such as ACBA
in Armenia.
SME support centres, new organisations which
bypass existing organisations such as Chambers
of Commerce, have been established in each NIS
partner state with Tacis funds. They have
provided training and advice for new
entrepreneurs. In the largest cities of Russia, the
centres are now being supported by either local
governments and/or donors other than Tacis and
are managing to survive financially.
In co-operation with the World Bank and USAID,
Tacis has provided methodological and
operational support for the mass privatisation
process.
In enterprise restructuring, Tacis is the only
significant donor focusing on the industry group of
medium and large sized (former) state
enterprises, where many of the problems are
most prominent. Substantial emphasis has been
placed on a coaching model for managers aimed
at changing their management attitudes, style and
practices. This coaching model was carried out
within individual companies. The work entailed a
number of phases, including diagnostics, initiative
development and initiative implementation, and
some limited revitalising measures. Revitalisation
measures which do not need the support of
additional finance are an important feature of the
model.
Tacis support for the conversion of defence
industries has mainly focused on promoting joint
ventures and on technical product advice.
The evaluation finds that, with respect to central
banks, Tacis has in a number of cases
contributed positively to the design and
implementation of modern payment and clearing
systems (Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Belarus
and Russia). Less success, however, has been
achieved with the introduction of international
accounting standards. In the field of capital
markets and insurance, Tacis has had some
influence as the first donor, but any follow-up in
these areas has been taken over by other donors.
The influence of the SME centres in promoting an
SME-enabling environment has been limited.
With the exception of some of the centres in the
larger Russian cities, most of these centres face a
bleak future without Tacis funding. Their
managers and shareholders are observed to be
redirecting the core activities towards the
commercial consultancy market. Except in large
Russian cities, however, the private market for
enterprise support services is still too under-
developed to expect a substantial degree of
sustainability.
Initiatives with respect to the mass privatisation
process have had noticeable success in
increasing the speed, transparency and
accountability of privatisation in Ukraine,
Armenia, Georgia and Moldova. By contrast, in
Belarus and Azerbaijan, the same approach was
adopted but with either no political support
(Azerbaijan) or gradually disappearing support
(Belarus).
In Ukraine, where the enterprise restructuring
process is beginning to show positive results, the
state privatisation centres and newly established
post-privatisation centres are co-operating with
Tacis in promoting the creation of local
consultancy companies for continuation of this
work on a larger scale.
Whilst some successes in conversion of the
defence industry are evident, mainly in Russia,
vested interests and security aspects have
reduced effectiveness.
TA to Mutual and Investment Funds in
Armenia
The overall objective of the project was to
promote the privatisation process, the
restructuring of enterprise and the development
of capital markets. The specific objective was to
promote the creation of a legal framework for
investment funds and capital markets. In addition,
a pilot investment fund was established.
Strengths and weaknesses: the contractor gave
priority to the more administrative results of the
project (such as fund registration). Consequently,
the Fund’s sustainability was given less attention.
The contractor followed a specific approach which
emphasised specific local circumstances and
vested interests. This was seen as being much
more important for the sound functioning of
institutions than the skills of its staff. As a result,
while it was fairly efficient in negotiations with the
Fund’s shareholders and in making up a strong,
influential Board of Directors, it was fairly
inefficient in transferring professional skills to the
Fund’s Management Company.
The first established Investment Fund in Armenia
has not yet started to invest in corporate
securities and lacks proper professionals. In spite
of the contractor’s efforts, the legal framework still
remains unsatisfactory and no other investment
fund has been established in Armenia at the
moment. Capital markets in Armenia remain
rudimentary, their development substantially
lagging behind the development of other sectors
in Armenia and behind capital markets in most
other post-socialist countries.
The case shows that Tacis projects should be
appropriate to the state of economic and
institutional development of the country
concerned. An unfavourable environment is in
general a major hindrance for project
implementation. Low adaptability requires a
certain flexibility from the project management to
amend the TOR or even to stop the project. Part
and parcel of each Tacis project is the transfer of
know-how, meaning that the establishment of an
institution should imply that Task managers and
monitors are able to ensure the realisation of this
principle. If the principle proves to be irrelevant
under local circumstances, implementation of the
project should be reconsidered.
TA for implementation of the privatisation
strategy in Georgia.
The right people at the right place and the
right time
The overall objective of the project was to ensure
the success of the privatisation programme of the
government of Georgia in support of economic
reform objectives.
The specific objective was to develop and
strengthen the institutional, legal and
methodological bases of the Ministry of State
Property Management (MoSPM), to build capacity
to implement the mass privatisation programme
and to carry out a number of pilot privatisations
with foreign participation.
A decisive project asset was the resident Team
Leader, who was always available and well
informed. The individual characteristics of the
Team Leader enabled him to become a leading
figure in Georgian privatisation and to influence
the decision making process convincingly. Finally,
excellent personal working relationships of the
consultants and MoSPM staff, as well as the co-
operative effort, characterised this project. In
addition, the project also distinguished itself by
good co-operation with the World Bank project,
which can be explained by the fact that the
resident Team Leader was also involved in a
World Bank privatisation project.
It is recognised by MoSPM that without the
project, speed of privatisation and quality of its
implementation would have been lower. Although
the project produced palpable impact at the initial
stage of the privatisation process, its long lasting
impact appeared to be rather modest. The project
shows that the right people in the right place at
the right time results in impressive progress. It
also shows that follow-up project strategies should
be considered thoroughly to ensure sustainability
of the results achieved. In Georgia, as in some
other countries, Tacis seems to have switched too
early to post-privatisation support while
assistance to the privatisation process was still
badly needed.
The Transport & Telecommunication Sector
A total of 202 MECU was allocated to this sector.
The NIS partners see the Telecommunication
sector in Europe as an example to follow in terms
of technology development, restructuring and
privatisation and new regulation of the market. In
the Transport sector, a key objective of the Tacis
Programme has been to provide support to
ensure that a viable transport capability is
available to cope with increased industrial
volumes as they develop. Tacis started with a
large number of feasibility studies and master
plans. Since 1994/95, support has been provided
mainly to inter-state programmes such as
Traceca and the Caucasus/Central Asia pipeline
projects, both of which have geopolitical
significance.
The evaluation finds that, for Transport, the
feasibility studies and master plans provided
considerable insight but have had little impact on
the capacities of the transport organisations
involved.. At the same time, the partner
organisations were sometimes not involved in the
planning process and were restricted to only
delivering information needed by the consultants
to do their work. However, it is clear that the
creation of the regulatory framework supported by
Tacis has contributed to the beginning of dialogue
between EU and NIS partners on investment. The
reorientation of the sector towards inter-state
programmes in 1994/95 has been a positive step.
Traceca – Transport Management Training
The objectives of the project were: (a) to provide
training through seminars and study tours to
Europe of two groups of local officials (Senior and
Middle to Lower Level) in market oriented
transport systems and procedures; (b) to foster
regional co-operation within NIS transport and
trade sectors.
The project was among the first TRACECA
projects to be implemented. The local
environment was still characterised by weak
regional co-operation and limited awareness on
TRACECA and Tacis. It included the local training
of 100 and 150 officials in two groups and two
study tours each for 35 persons.
Three months were spent on project preparation.
The definition of the basic needs (with a certain
degree of flexibility) was carried out in co-
operation with the recipients and the Task
Manager. The flexibility of the training
programme and its adaptability to the local
situation led to increased acceptance by the
participants. The trainers’ preparation, the quality
of training material, adequate administrative
support and the inclusion in the programme of the
most attractive issues, contributed to the trainees’
enthusiasm. The press and TV coverage
increased the project’s acceptance by the
governmental and wider environments. The well-
organised study tours provided good examples of
practices and produced promising business
contacts.
The project was implemented successfully and on
time and it was positively evaluated by the
recipients. It also had important positive effects
on the trainees’ colleagues at home.
Nuclear Safety
It must be pointed out that the Nuclear Safety
programme has a different structure, and
therefore presented certain difficulties for the
evaluation. The overriding justification for Tacis
activities in this sector is the concern for safety.
The nuclear safety programme has a total funding
to date of 468 MECU. Tacis rules allow a 50 per
cent contribution towards investment in
equipment for projects in this sector. Tacis has
been instrumental in the development of new
nuclear safety legislation and in the establishment
of regulatory authorities in Russia and Ukraine.
These are independent of the bodies responsible
for constructing and/or operating nuclear power
plants (NPPs). On-site safety improvements in
NPPs (with equipment delivery) have been
promoted, as well as the introduction of a new
safety-oriented business culture. The latter is
based on the integrated chain concept which
encompasses design, management, and waste
treatment.
The evaluation finds that he absence of a Joint
Management Unit in Russia presents problems
for contractors in the practical implementation of
their projects. Similar problems did not arise in
Ukraine, where the Co-ordinating Unit also has a
role in the nuclear field. The establishment of
independent regulatory bodies is seen as a
considerable achievement. In nuclear legislation,
some important steps have been taken towards
adopting internationally recognised practices.
However, it is regretted that there is no consistent
national policy or nuclear programme in Ukraine,
though some recent developments are
encouraging in these respects. The economic
viability of the sector in all countries is poor, with
problems including non-payment by end-users for
the energy produced. This, in turn, leaves
insufficient funds, even to pay wages. Also, the
whole issue of nuclear liability is affecting the
sector’s performance. There is a vast potential for
synergy in the assistance programmes, especially
in the dissemination of the project results, but this
has not yet been exploited fully.
Transfer of Western European regulatory
methodology and practices to the nuclear
safety authorities of Ukraine
The specific objective of this project was to
approve and introduce nuclear safety regulations.
During the project period, several positive steps
were taken to strengthen the nuclear safety
regime in Ukraine: the law on nuclear power
utilisation and radiation safety and the law on
radioactive waste management in Ukraine as well
as some other regulations were introduced. This
development has created a pertinent framework
for the utilisation of nuclear energy in Ukraine. A
group of technical safety organisations to support
the activities of the Nuclear Regulatory
Administration (NRA) has been established.
The cuts in the budget of the Ministry of
Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety
(MEPNS) in 1996, combined with the increase of
duties in relation to the licensing process, limited
the abilities of MEPNS to achieve the specific
objective.
The case shows that the achievement of the
objective depends crucially on the performance of
the Partner Organisation. That is why a certain
flexibility was built into the project to adjust the
timing and content of the workplan to meet the
actual needs and possibilities of the Partner
Organisation. Flexibility in distribution of
resources between the tasks was, however,
insufficient.
The state budget allocations are not sufficient to
meet the current needs of the NRA to perform its
regulatory tasks. The availability of finance for the
recipient needs to be assured in some way. The
proposals and agreements made for this purpose
during the project period did not lead to any
solution.
Non-nuclear Energy
The Non-nuclear Energy sector, in the regular
Tacis Programme, has been allocated 259
MECU. Recent years have seen the number of
projects decline significantly as their size
increases, and some soft conditionality enforced
before new projects start. Pilot demonstration
projects have been limited in number. In the field
of general energy sector management and energy
policy development, advice has concentrated on
the establishment of new and more consolidated
forms of sector co-ordination. In Georgia, for
example, Tacis advice was a factor in the
establishment of the new Ministry of Energy. The
EU experience of privatisation has had a direct
influence on policy formulation. It has also had an
influence on decisions and implementation
related to the restructuring and regulation of an
energy market with privatised generators and
suppliers (for example, in Ukraine and Armenia).
With respect to oil and gas, where vested
interests are very strong, regulation of the market
and the operating companies is now being looked
at seriously. Restructuring studies and
management training have featured prominently
in coal mining. A series of energy saving centres
were established which have promoted
awareness of good energy saving practices and
have had a policy advisory role.
The evaluation finds that in the Non-nuclear
Energy sector, the economic effects of
geography, trade and redevelopment are unequal
amongst the NIS countries. At the same time, all
countries are handicapped by their common
heritage of central planning. Most countries have
addressed the problem of energy efficiency in the
domestic sector but relatively little attention has
been paid to renewable energy, perhaps with
good reason, since these are not yet very
relevant to the transition of the NIS economies.
Management training in coal mining proved to be
highly useful. Policy work, however, has proved
to be of less value.
The future of the energy saving centres is
doubtful, due to the lack of market demand for
their services. In some countries, governments
are now creating their own energy saving
committees as replacements. Tacis has not
always been able to present a clear message to
recipients and, from early monitoring reports at
least, there is evidence that the POs expected
large investment funds or the provision of more
equipment. In general, focus in Russia has been
on technical projects, which have had
considerable success. There appear to be fewer
problems with local partners in Russia compared
with, for example, Central Asia. In Ukraine there
have been more restructuring projects which,
given the slow pace of reform, have – not
surprisingly – been less successful. There is too
little sharing of information and experience within
and between countries. For example, there was
no attempt to learn from the different experiences
of the energy centres before setting up a new
generation of them.
Strategic Coal Audit
The project was initiated under the 1993 Tacis
Programme, together with two other projects
aimed at assisting the coal mining industry in the
Kuzbass region of Western Siberia (Training of
Coal Mine Managers and Improvement of Health
and Safety Standards). Facing severe problems
in terms of productivity and profitability in an
emerging market economy, the local association
Kuznetskugol, incorporating 18 mines, was
chosen to be the project partner.
The contractor was expected to analyse the
project partner and the current position of every
mine relative to organisational, operational
aspects as well as economic performance. An
assessment of the market potential was to be
performed resulting in recommendations on how
to improve the economic performance of the
mines and the development of a business and
strategic plan. Experience and knowledge was to
be gained by project partners through study tours
to Western Europe and training. Advanced
Western equipment was to be provided.
The project’s TOR had been well designed to suit
the project partner’s needs, particularly if seen in
conjunction with the other two projects. The
project partner has expressed satisfaction with the
contractor’s performance emerging from
numerous discussions, extensive and
professionally prepared reports containing an
analysis and evaluation of options, and well
prepared and executed study tours. Generic
guidelines on developing a business plan for coal-
mining associations were an important
contribution, in co-ordination with WB activities in
this sector. The project partner has already
started to implement some of the contractor’s
recommendations.
Much appropriate and professional information
has been provided. Drastic changes requiring
extensive funding are unlikely to take place in the
near future because of the absence of major
macroeconomic and policy related decisions
regarding the future role of coal as compared with
oil and gas. However, the project has certainly
contributed to creating awareness of the problems
which exist and which need to be solved to
ensure viability in a market driven economy.
Food & Agriculture
For the Food & Agriculture sector, Tacis has
allocated 277 MECU. In most countries, it has
fielded support teams for agricultural policy
reforms. Much of the Tacis funding has been
focused on studies and master plans, directed by
the recipients towards state-controlled institutions
and ministries, who wish to maintain some degree
of control over the content of the programmes.
More recently, focus has shifted to the grass
roots, with pilot projects aimed at demonstrating
the value of reforms. Unfortunately, the
Evaluation Team concludes that the privatisation
actions undertaken in this sector would have had
greater impact if each specific action had been
linked with the enterprise restructuring and
development sector, or if all these actions had
been put under the ERD sector. The evolution of
policy within the sector has been influenced by
the experience of key policy makers of the
economic concepts governing policy formulation
and implementation, and by their ability to
manage the strategies required to achieve the
objectives of the policy.
The evaluation finds that the effect of the
support for policy reforms, when measured
against observed policy change and actual
implementation of new policies, has been
negligible. There has ,however,been some
influence on the awareness of policy makers to
the need for changes, but there is no other sector
where the resistance to change is as strong.
Workers and managers also resist change and, at
the political level, support for reform-oriented
legislation is still weak and fiercely debated.
Where support from Tacis coincided with
government’s wish to reform, for example in
Georgia and later in Azerbaijan and Armenia,
important policy assistance has proved effective
and appreciated. The impact of the pilot projects,
generally considered as a suitable direction for
future activities, has been limited because of the
absence of financial resources and an enabling
environment. A new development is the positive
response at local administrative levels to the new
co-operative integrated food chain approaches
which have been run as an experiment in
Ukraine. Average project duration is either 12 or
24 months. There is evidence in the sector of
growing concern that project duration is currently
not sufficient to achieve all the TOR objectives
and create project sustainability.
Regional Agricultural Reform Project 2
(Kyrgyzstan and Tadjikistan)
The overall project objectives are to: strengthen
the agricultural sectors in Kyrgyzstan and
Tadjikistan and increase production of staple
crops, secure domestic food supply, reduce the
current dependency on food aid and develop
policies promoting agricultural reform and the
private sector in agriculture.
The specific objectives are to: alleviate the
current constraints to agricultural food production
through the rehabilitation of irrigation systems,
the establishment of water management
organisations, the development of a local
commercial seed industry; increase the supply of
essential agricultural inputs; establish rural credit
schemes; develop agricultural advisory services,
and; identify and fund selected pilot projects in
agro-processing trade and marketing.
In Tadjikistan, about one third of the proceeds
from food aid were ‘lost’ and were not paid into
the CPF account managed jointly by the
Government and Project. Subsequently, however,
in May 1997, the whole amount has been
transferred to the fund. Also in Tadjikistan, the
counterpart funds proved too large for the
Ministry of Agriculture since there were no
appropriate budget lines for assisting agricultural
production. The Project suffered because of the
lost revenue but also because of the difficulty in
obtaining foreign exchange for purchasing
irrigation and agricultural inputs. In Kyrgyzstan,
most of the objectives were achieved with the
exception of the rural credit component. The
opinion of the Kyrgyzstan MoA is that RARP2
project is the best Tacis project in the country
because the benefits are tangible and there will
be an actual visible impact, particularly with
irrigation and seed development. The
development of rural credit in Kyrgyzstan has not
been so successful because the credit line was
established using an existing MoA line and not,
which would have been far better, new revolving
credit centres at local level using existing NGOs
or structures set up by Tacis projects.
Sustainability for a food aid programme is greatly
enhanced if the food aid can firstly be sold, and
then the proceeds administered under the
auspices of Tacis technical assistance through
grants and credits. The partner in Kyrgyzstan has
also clearly benefited in the areas of seed
production and irrigation development policy. The
project has assisted public and private
institutions, for example the MoAs and farmer
associations, and will have an impact, albeit
small, on the welfare of the country. The picture
has not been nearly as good in Tadjikistan
because of political instability and the very weak
institutional framework.
6.3 Database statistics and
analysis
The Evaluation Team has constructed a database
on the latest monitoring reports of Tacis projects.
Systematic monitoring of Tacis projects started in
1993. The database contains information on 1010
projects, 481 completed projects, 461 projects
which are on record as ongoing, and 68 projects
which were last monitored in their inception
phase. Together, these projects represent 85% of
all Tacis projects started up in the period 1991-
1996 with budgets larger than 300,000 ECU. This
coverage is extensive allowing the Evaluation
Team to draw conclusions for the Tacis project
portfolio as a whole, as well as providing results
at country land NIS-wide sector levels6. In this
report only some of the main findings are
presented.
To provide the reader with a better understanding
of the results presented here, the basic structure
of the data collected by the Tacis monitoring
programme is summarised.
Monitors assess project performance on the basis
of the following main criteria:
· the appropriateness of the TOR and project
strategy chosen to achieve the project
objectives;
· contractor performance in terms of the timely
and comprehensive implementation of the
project workplan;
                                           
6 Full details of the data base, statistical tests and a
complete set of results are provided in Annex 6 of
this study.
· the contribution of the PO to the achievement
of project outputs;
· the achievement of planned outputs;
· the appropriateness of the planned outputs
and project objectives for the PO;
· the achievement of the targeted objectives;
and finally the sustainability of the
achievements.
Scores for project performance
The monitors report on their findings and use a
scoring system to summarise their conclusions.
The scores comprise 5 grades; an “A” stands for
excellent, a “B” stands for good, a “C” signifies an
adequate with good aspects, “D” signals adequate
with poor aspects and “E” stands for poor. For this
study, the scores have been regrouped and
simplified to three categories: Good which
comprises the A and B grades; POsitive for the C
grade; and Bad for the D and E grades. Bad thus
comprises disappointing performance as well as
complete failures.
Review of Tacis overall performance
Table 6.1. below shows a number of performance indicators for the completed projects in the monitoring
portfolio.
Table 6.1. Performance of completed projects (481 projects)
Indicator values
Indicators Good Positive Bad Total
Contractor performance 53% 31% 16% 100%
Partner contribution 33% 47% 20% 100%
Results/Outputs 38% 42% 20% 100%
Appropriateness for the PO 55% 32% 13% 100%
Achievement of objectives 30% 41% 29% 100%
Sustainability of achievements 27% 48% 25% 100%
Sum of all indicators 41% 39% 20% 100%
Note: The classification ‘Good’ covers excellent, outstanding projects and projects performing well; ‘POsitive’ means that project
performance is according to plan or according to what could reasonably be expected; and ‘Bad’ means that the project performance has been
disappointing or poor.
Contractor performance has so far been
satisfactory but ......
“In the early years we could not judge the quality
of western experts, even poor experts could open
our eyes to our own situation and give insight in
the issues that we would face in the coming
years. Our demands are higher now, we can only
learn from real experts”. (State Property Agency,
Ukraine)
It can be observed that 30 per cent of the projects
have fully achieved their objectives, 41 per cent
are assessed as positive which means that they
performed adequately and as planned, while 29
per cent have been disappointing or a failure.
It is interesting to note that the scores on
sustainability are slightly better. This reflects the
fact that, in quite a number of cases, the project
objectives were set too high or wrongly, and could
not be achieved but, nevertheless, the projects
transferred know-how and increased the abilities
of the partner organisation. This is a frequent
problem and it is part of the monitors’ regular job
to alert project management on such matters.
They are also obliged to ensure that the PO and
the contractor set commonly shared, realistic
immediate objectives for the project. Central in
this is the pursuance of feasible project
implementation targets which can be achieved in
the external environment in which the project is
placed.
The highest performance score concerns the
appropriateness of the project for the partner
organisation. Across all sectors, 55 per cent of the
projects are perceived by the PO and monitors as
having addressed the right issues for increasing
PO abilities. For a further 32 per cent of the
projects, the targeting was adequate. In 13 per
cent of the cases, the projects are assessed as
poor on this score.
The data confirm that a well-designed project
(appropriateness: 55 per cent is good) and a
highly qualified contractor (performance: 53 per
cent is good) are not sufficient to ensure that a
project fully achieves its objectives (here only 30
per cent). It is the commitment of the PO which is
the most crucial factor for project success or
failure.
Finally, it is interesting to note that 13 per cent of
the projects have failed to be found appropriate at
the completion stage. Such projects might have
been expected to have been terminated during
implementation.
Review of programme performance against
the criterion of effectiveness.
Effectiveness
The indicator used for measuring effectiveness is
the monitoring score on the extent to which
completed and ongoing projects have achieved,
or are expected to achieve, their objectives.
To measure differences per country the
compound score for the Tacis portfolio as a whole
was given an index value of 100. Higher scores
show above average performers, lower scores
show below average performance (see table....)
To measure the differences per sector the
maximum score was set as 100%. The average
scores per sector are calculated as a fraction of
this.
Figure 6.1. Tacis project effectiveness differs per country (100 = the average performance)
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Note: Mongolia and Tadjikistan are excluded from the figure, because of too few completed projects.
Figure 6.1. shows differences in project
effectiveness by countries. It indicates that there
is a positive correlation between Tacis
performance at project level and the extent to
which market oriented economic reforms are
implemented in the
various NIS countries. Tacis effectiveness is seen
to be highest in Armenia, Georgia and the
Russian Federation. On the other end of the scale
feature Belarus, Azerbaijan and Tadjikistan.
Table 6.2. Tacis project effectiveness differs by sector
Effectiveness
completed ongoing Total
in % in % in %
Energy 63 64 63
Enterprise Restructuring & Development60 61 60
Food & Agriculture 55 59 56
Facilities 50 62 60
Human Resource Development 58 62 61
Nuclear Safety 65 56 60
Transport & Telecommunications 57 67 61
Tacis 59 62 60
Source: Tacis Monitoring database
On the scale of 1-100, the overall effectiveness is
60 per cent. This percentage is an average for
both completed and ongoing projects. The result
is positive and can be interpreted in two ways.
First, it confirms that Tacis as a programme is
performing well. Secondly, it shows that there is
still considerable scope for improvement.
The differences per sector on the effectiveness
score are significant, but relatively small. Even
the best performing sectors like Nuclear Safety
(on the completed portfolio of projects) and
Energy do not reach beyond 65 per cent
effectiveness. At the lower end of the scale, the
data would indicate an improvement in the
effectiveness of the F&A sector comparing
completed and ongoing projects, but the overall
performance at 56 per cent is the only score
below average. In the NIS-wide sector paper on
Agriculture this is commented on:
From the NIS-wide Agriculture Sector Review
“Complete successes have been relatively few in
the F&A sector, but the mutual learning problems
have been overcome. Tacis assistance is actively
pursued by the beneficiaries, and programmes
and projects are now being targeted to more
pragmatic and practical objectives, including
emphasis on financial viability. Beneficiaries and
national partners, through exposure to western
free market concepts and attitudes, are beginning
to understand the objectives of Tacis, to nominate
appropriate partners and to play a fuller part in
the identification and preparation of projects. It is
still, nonetheless a common observation by
national partners that Tacis should involve them
more, and make fuller use of local experts and
counterparts.”
6.4 Implementation efficiency
Efficiency
Project implementation efficiency can be
illustrated by two indicators
Output performance i.e, the extent to which
Tacis projects have succeeded in delivering their
planned outputs. From the data base the
weighted average scores are used on outputs for
completed and ongoing projects (see Table 6.3);
and
Project intervention requirements. The
percentage of ongoing projects in the different
countries in which Tacis operates and for which
the monitoring reports indicate that action from
the TM or project parties is needed to improve
cost-effectiveness (see Figures 6.2 and 6.3).
The table below is based on the output
performance indicator and shows that there are
only limited variations in implementation
efficiency between sectors. The overall efficiency
is estimated at 63 per cent, calculated on the
basis of outputs achieved against outputs
planned. This shows that there is substantial room
for improvement in efficiency performance
through tightening project implementation
management practices and promoting more cost-
effectiveness in project implementation.
Table 6.3. Tacis implementation efficiency
Implementation efficiency
completed ongoing Total
in % in % in %
Energy 69 63 67
Enterprise Restructuring & Development 66 62 64
Food & Agriculture 60 62 61
Facilities 60 62 62
Human Resource Development 65 62 63
Nuclear Safety 65 56 60
Transport & Telecommunications 59 62 61
Tacis 64 62 63
Source: Tacis Monitoring database
Across all sectors, the following factors are those
considered by the monitoring teams to be
instrumental in delivering positive or good project
performance results:
· collaboration of the project partner in
formulating the TOR from the start;
· the use of the inception phase for amendment
of the TOR if required;
· the selection of contractors with in-depth
project experience in the NIS environment,
knowledge of Tacis procedures, and strong
project management and backstopping skills
(this is ,however,inconsistent with the 1996
regulation);
· a good working relationship between the
contractor and the project partner;
· the use of a substantial input of qualified local
experts in project delivery.
Figure 6.2. below shows an analysis of the degree
of intervention required during the implementation
of projects to ensure good performance. The data
for this analysis come from the monitoring
grading system, which identifies those projects
which have “need for action” (Grade D) , and
those projects with one or more Grade E scores
which signals to the TM that an “urgent review to
assess continuation” is required.
On average, 40 per cent of the projects have
implementation problems. This means that
considerable management effort is required to
ensure that these projects produce their results.
Much of this effort is to come from the Task
Managers, as they have a contractual “stick” to
ensure better performance of the contractor and
the partner organisation. However, Task
Managers frequently do not have the time or
resources to properly address “problem” projects,
due to their overloaded project portfolios. In
addition, travel budgets and travel authorisation
procedures restrict the ability of the Task
Manager to make the necessary visits to the
project in order to assess the situation.
CUs frequently intervene effectively when project
implementation issues arise, particularly if
difficulties for project performance originate from
the project partner. The intervention role of the
Delegation in project implementation could be
effectively increased.
Figure 6.2. Percentages of projects per sector needing intervention (by number and by value)
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Figure 6.3. Percentages of projects per country needing intervention (by number and by value)
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Figure 6.3. above shows the need for project
intervention broken down by country. Together,
the two tables suggest that the requirement for
intervention is linked to two factors: (i)
peculiarities of the sector, as explained above
and (ii) the extent to which countries differ in their
commitment to the reform process. An interesting
case in point is Moldova, where the portfolio
consists of sectors requiring high levels of
interventions (military conversion and
agriculture).
Chapter 7 Analysis of effectiveness and impact
7.1. Introduction
This part of the evaluation is to present the
findings of the evaluation on the impact of Tacis
on the reform process in the NIS and Mongolia in
the period 1991-1996.
Impact
Impact is normally defined as the contributions to
the content and pace of market economic reforms
and the reinforcement of democracy in the NIS
and Mongalia. An authoritative conclusion on this
criterion is beyond the scope of this report.
Instead, the term impact has been defined for the
purpose of this report in terms of Tacis
contributions to: (I) attitude changes, (ii) policy
changes and the pace of reforms, (iii) capacity
development in public and private sector
institutions, (iv) capacity development in the field
of training and education, (v) welfare reinforcing
democracy and civil society, and finally (vi)
unintended side effects from the programme.
As explained in the introduction to the is report,
various methods of data collection were used for
impact analysis, but the analysis can do no more
than provide a first insight into the impact of
Tacis. The findings presented here are mainly
based on “soft” information, primarily views and
perceptions of key actors, and the evaluators do
not claim that they provide more than indications
on the likely impact of Tacis in the NIS.
The chapter starts with a discussion on the
importance of attitude changes and the type of
contributions which Tacis is making in this
respect. This is followed by information from
questionnaires used to obtain the views from the
NCs and/or CU Directors on the significance of
Tacis contributions to policy changes and the
pace of sector reforms. Subsequently the findings
of the cross-cutting theme papers are
summarised. These parts give some insight into
the type of Tacis contribution to capacity
developments in:
· Public sector institutions;
· Private sector institutions;
· Training and education; and
· Welfare, support of democracy and civil
society
Following a discussion on side-effects of the
Tacis programme, the chapter concludes with a
summary of the main findings.
7.2. Attitude change
A change in attitudes is very difficult to measure
without a proper survey before and after a Tacis
project intervention. To the knowledge of the
Evaluation Team, there is no such survey readily
available. In the absence of such, perceptions of
some key-actors who have worked with Tacis
projects for the last four years are presented
below.
“We were isolated in our own world. Joint work of
our experts with EU experts on problems in
Ukraine gave us a wider view and this allowed us
to understand the problems of debt and this
facilitated the process of finding the ways to solve
the problems.”
From the workshops’ transcripts and the interview
notes there is one dominant finding. The strength
of Tacis lies in its people-to-people approach.
Tens of thousands of NIS experts, administrators
and managers have met and co-operated with
their EU counterparts. This has started an
ongoing process by which different cultures,
norms and values have met, to the enrichment of
both sides. The interview notes confirm that the
NIS partners especially appreciated the positive
aspects of the EU business culture, the principles
of openness, team work, information sharing and
the constructive approach to identifying and
solving problems. These norms and values are
foreign to their personal experiences hitherto.
The lessons from Tacis monitoring show that
western methods and techniques of economic
management cannot be transferred directly. Only
in rare cases is the problem-solving, western
approach to economic management perceived as
having relevance for developments in the NIS.
However, at the very least, it does provide a
reference point.
“We had no idea about the working of a market
economy; we just started privatising early until we
found out – through a Tacis project – that what we
really needed was first a European type
regulatory framework to set up a market in which
privatised suppliers can function efficiently.”
More than anything else, the experts of Tacis
have contributed to the development of a more
realistic, pragmatic view and a better
understanding of the type of economy and the
type of pluralistic society which the EU
represents. This is essential because it has
become clear in the period 1991-1997 that the
initial understanding in most of the NIS states of
the “western market economy model” has been a
very dogmatic one, originating in Soviet and
western (US) propaganda. Looking back, it has
become clear that the commitment to and
understanding of the reform process, as existed in
the Phare countries bordering Europe, did not
exist in any of the partner countries of Tacis.
“The restructuring process in the sector goes
faster thanks to Tacis. The number of Ukrainian
experts has increased by working jointly with EU
experts and we are now approaching a critical
mass in the organisation of people who have
started to communicate and who think in the
same way about the strategy of reform.”
The predictions made in 1991 about the possible
high speed of the transition process have proved
to be too optimistic for some sectors and simply
wrong and naïve for others. The problems
involved have been grossly underestimated. For
a new market economy, in sectors such as
banking and macro-economic policy, the
transition scenarios proved not to be entirely
unrealistic but still too optimistic. For sectors
which required real restructuring such as
agriculture, industry and public administration,
experience has shown the assumptions to be
unrealistic and naïve. Vested interests often block
reforms, while the majority of the workforce
employed have no faith in the benefits of reform,
nor might they be expected to. More especially,
over the past five years, they have seen their
standard of living decline. In addition, their
salaries are paid infrequently and they see many
people enriching themselves on the strength of
widespread corruption. In short, the willingness of
the population to support the reform programmes
of the current governments is, at least in most
NIS states, substantially less then in 1991. Faith
in a quick process of transition has died. In turn, a
restructuring and development process has
started in the NIS, the outcome of which is
unknown, as is its duration.
Belarus Economic Trends (EES-3)
– an example of changing peoples attitudes –
The overall objective of the project is to design a
sophisticated economic information system
required to explain the economic reform process.
The specific objective is to provide regularly
updated economic and statistical information on
economic developments in Belarus through
publishing the Belarus Economic Trends (BET).
By the end of the project 12 monthly editions and
four quarterly ones were issued. The circulation
was 300 copies in English, 500 in Russian, and
300-500 electronic copies via Internet.
Strengths and weaknesses: The project was
implemented in a political environment
resembling the old regime where information
distortions were the rule. BET responded to the
specific circumstances by commenting on
information distortions, revising official statistics,
filling information gaps, activities which have
been highly appreciated by the project
beneficiaries in both private and public sectors.
The project was run by an exceptionally active
and enthusiastic team leader.
Effect: BET appeared to be a unique economic
and statistical publication in Belarus, the only
source of information that is regularly updated,
based on a wide range of time series data, which
are consistent, reliable and provide
comprehensive analysis of economic conditions.
Impact: BET produced palpable impact on the
improvement of official statistics, it contributed
substantially to a better understanding of the
economic situation in Belarus by its residents. In
the language of dry statistics, BET made the
economic situation transparent and argued in
favour of economic reforms.
Lessons to be learned: Often, when the political
regime is unfavourable and the reform process is
stagnating or reversible, the question about cost-
effectiveness of TA arises. The BET experience
proves that a project can have impact even in a
reform-handicapped country if the personal will to
succeed is strong enough.
7.3. Tacis contribution to the
direction and pace of reforms
To obtain the views from the NIS on the
contributions from Tacis to the reform processes,
the Evaluation Team designed a formal eight-
page questionnaire in Engliah and Russian for the
Tacis NCs and the Directors of the CUs. Nine of
the thirteen questionnaires were completed, some
during interviews, other directly by the NCs.
Unfortunately the questionnaires from Russia and
three other countries were not returned to the
evaluators in time for inclusion in this report
Table 7.1. In which fields did Tacis have a major influence in your country?
Armenia Belarus Kazakhstan Azerbaijan Georgia Kyrgyzstan Tadjikistan Ukraine Turkmenistan
Sector:
Nuclear safety H M L M
Energy H L M M H M M
HRD M L H M M H H L M
Food &
Agriculture
L 0 M M L M H M H
Transport and
Telecoms
M 0 M M M L M
ERD-Financial
Services
M L M L M M L M
ERD-
Restructuring
0/L 0 M L M M L M
ERD – SME
support
M 0/L M L M M L M
Cross cutting
themes
Policy
formulation
M L M M M L M
Public sector
development
0/L 0 M L L
Private sector
development
M L M M H L L
Education and
Training
M M M M M H M M
Social
welfare/well-
being
M M M L M L
Technology
transfer
0/L 0/L M L M L M
Investment
promotion
0/L 0/L L L L M
Environmental
protection
M L M L L
Democracy
and civil
society
L M L L L
Legend: H = high impact; M = medium impact; L = lw impact; 0 = zero impact.
Source: TIE, CU questionnaires
The results of the questionnaire for the Tacis
National Co-ordinators have, by and large, been
confirmed in subsequent interviews and in
workshops. In most countries, Tacis has been the
first donor in a number of important fields of the
economic reform process including on-site
nuclear safety, energy sector restructuring,
agricultural policy, transport corridor planning,
bank training
and the development of enterprise restructuring
approaches and SME promotion centres. In a
number of these fields, Tacis has contributed
positively to the reform of policy development
and implementation. The questionnaires indicate
that, without Tacis support, in the areas listed
above, the pace of policy reforms and the pace of
reform implementation might have been
noticeably slower.
7.4. Findings from cross-cutting theme case studies
The evaluation methodology in the TOR required
the assessment of impact on issues which were
common across sectors. These issues were
termed “cross-cutting themes”. As explained
above, the majority of evidence underlying the
following summaries of findings is qualitative and
focuses on impact at the micro level. The
following are the main points arising from the
research.
Although the evidence for the following sections
is primarily qualitative, it is substantiated by an
extensive number of interviews and 64
documented case studies. The Evaluation Team
has focused on the effects of Tacis activities and
indications of influence in the various
environments in which the programme is working.
This has led to the following conclusions.
Public Sector Institutional Development
· high impact in major public administration
reform has been achieved in a small
number of cases where governments
have demonstrated real commitment to
change
· high impact has been achieved with a
significant number of senior officials
having been exposed to modern practice
in public administration through training
programmes
· the development of new management
procedures in regional and local
government with the simultaneous
development of relevant training capacity
has resulted in impact in a number of
specific localities
· limited impact has been achieved thus far
through the dissemination of the lessons
learnt from public reform projects
· improved organisational and personnel
capacity in ministries associated with
sector specific projects demonstrates
positive impact
· medium impact has been achieved
through the development of new
legislation and there is scope for long
term impact through the development of
legislative drafting capacity.
 
Training for Russian Public Administrators in
 Market Economy
The aim of this project is to develop a faculty
at the Russian Academy for Public Service
capable of training senior public officials,
using modern teaching methods and
curricula, through a process of upgrading the
professional qualifications of senior faculty
members and top administrators from key
ministries. It is considered that the Academy
is now at the forefront of western trends in
public administration and is capable of
adapting them to the Russian situation.
Private Sector Institutional Development
· impact of restructuring agencies varies
greatly across countries;
· the success or failure of initiatives in
financial institutions depends on the
specific characteristics of the general
institutional environment;
· the creation of the first bank training
centres in Russia, Ukraine and Georgia
have had a positive effect in their
becoming the leading centres in their fields
in their countries;
· many initiatives in this sector, such as
credit unions, agricultural co-operative
banks and investment banks, were
originally put in place by Tacis;
· positive influence is evident in the
Agricultural Bank of Armenia, Sberbank in
Russia and the banking association in
Kazakhstan;
· less success is evident in the Sberbank
and Investment Fund in Armenia;
· Tacis support to the Regional Joint
Ventures scheme within the context of the
Bangkok facility is resulting in effective
impact in the transfer of know-how in areas
of venture capital and investment finance.
Tacis Support to EBRD Regional Venture Funds
The Regional Venture Funds (RVFs) are part of the EBRD
structure, established with the objectives of reinforcing and
strengthening enterprises selected on the basis of their
effective potential and fulfilling a larger synergetic role,
through the demonstration value of the Funds’ experience
and through dissemination at the regional level. Each RVF
has 24 MECU in equity funds from EBRD, with the
exception of Smolensk.
Each RVF is supported by Tacis pre- and post-investment
technical assistance, as part of the agreement reached
between Tacis and the EBRD, called the Bangkok facility.
The Tacis contribution to the Bangkok facility is 20 MECU
per year.
A recent in-depth monitoring exercise of the RVFs in
Russia indicates that the ratio of enterprises screened
against the ratio of enterprises receiving RVF equity is
comparable with ratios seen in private sector investment
funds. In addition, the monitoring exercise has determined
that considerable added value is being achieved through
the dissemination of know-how to enterprises and regional
authorities in the field of investment analysis, joint
ventures, and investment finance.
Policy development
· there are few signs of influence at the top
decision-making level
· in EES the signs of any impact are mixed
· policy studies relative to master-plans and
related instruments seem to have worked
well at the company level
· pilot projects are a good idea, but in
practice do not work in the policy field
· operational policy projects at middle-
management level have had reasonable
influence
· management training has shown to have
potential as a useful vehicle to reach top-
management levels
· Delegations’ accessibility to the top
decision-making levels is somewhat limited
· policy advice is readily accepted by both
new and existing public and private sector
institutions in those cases where they are
faced with a real demand for new service
which they are not yet providing
· Their is little evidence of impact of policy
advice related to restructuring of the state
administrations at central government
levels. Vested interests and has so far
been limited  on which have new here
there is no vested interest.
 
Federal Migration Service in Russia
The recognition of minority rights, refugees in this case,
and the formulation of appropriate legislation was a direct
result of a Tacis project to help the Federal Migration
Service in Russia with problems in the field of migration.
Technical assistance for the Service, set up in 1992,
enabled it to frame federal legislation that the Duma finally
approved. Experiences from visits to EU countries, such as
G rmany and the UK, were used to show Russian
legislators how to tackle the problems of refugees and
asylum seekers and how to meet their needs in a positive
way. Changing opinion and tangible results in the
legislation are a positive contribution to the objective of
civil society development.
Training and Education
· impact is highest at the level of specific
projects/institutions and lower at national
level
· impact is low but positive on the
governments’ capacity for policy
development within the sector
· greatest impact has been achieved
through the delivery of training and the
establishment of self-sustainable training
programmes
· impact on curriculum development has
also been high
· medium positive impact has been
achieved in changing the attitudes and
approach of a critical mass of individuals
who will in the future impact on reform
programmes
· impact on the match between workforce
skills and market needs is reasonably
positive.
 
 National Training System, Ukraine
Tacis has had considerable impact at the
level of specific training institutions, in
improving their organisational and
management capacity to enable them to
respond to external changes. In Ukraine,
Tacis participated in the creation of a
National Training System for nuclear power
plant personnel based on international
standards, in the development of the
Sevastopol Institute for nuclear specialists
a d the creation of a regional training centre
for maintenance at Zaporozhye nuclear
power plant. Simulator training is now
mandatory for licensing of nuclear power
plant operators.
Primary Health Care, Russia
Training has had an impact on NIS
appreciation of economic, social and political
aspects of life in W. Europe and its
relevance for East-West relations. Impact is
most noticeable as an outcome of study tours
or EU based training. The deepest
impressions are created by seeing
procedures and activities in person. It leads
to a much clearer understanding of what
Tacis is trying to achieve, a fuller
appreciation of the severity of the NIS
national situation, the differences between
NIS practices and outputs compared to those
in W. Europe and the options available if
harmonisation is required. Medium to
positive impact against this performance
indicator is most evident in Russia in western
patterns of primary heath care and GP based
practice.
Social Welfare
· positive impact on the social welfare of the
populations of the NIS has been achieved
by the Tacis programme
· within the human resources sector, impact
has been greatest in mainstream projects
in the area of employment support
· significant positive impact for the welfare
of the individual in terms of basic physical
necessities has been achieved by projects
in the sectors of food and agriculture,
energy, and nuclear energy
· the LIEN facility has been effective in
achieving impact in the areas of social
services support and support to
disadvantaged groups
· Tacis projects in the sector of enterprise
restructuring and development have had
an inevitable negative impact on social
welfare which was inadequately addressed
within the same projects
· less impact has been achieved in the area
of social policy development than in the
area of social policy implementation, due
to the highly political nature of social policy
and subsequent factors beyond the control
of the project.
 
Support to Employment Services, Ukraine
This project has made a significant contribution to
social welfare in the country through assisting
approximately 138,255 registered unemployed to
find work through re-training and counselling
activities over the period January 1994 to April 1997.
No information is available to determine how many
of these individuals are still in employment.
The same project has also assisted in developing an
improved system for registering the unemployed; on
the basis of this new system, the ILO forecasts that
80 per cent of the unemployed will be registered. This
project will have a sustained impact on social welfare
because it has developed an improved benefits
payment
system, which has more effective methods for
registering the unemployed.
Improved Residential Electricity Services, Armenia
This project included a sub-component called
“Co-operative venture for a new billing system”.
At the time of implementation, a large number of
apartment blocks were receiving electricity for no
more than three hours a day. This sub-component
worked closely with residents to identify a new
metered payment system for electrical usage. As a
directly attributable result of this, residents are now
receiving twenty-four hours of electricity daily. The
difference to personal living standards is considerable.
Democracy
· low impact has been achieved in sectoral
projects, for example in the sectors of
nuclear safety, telecommunications and
defence conversion
· limited but positive impact can be found
in the area of minority rights, particularly
through the LIEN and Democracy
programmes
· positive impact in the sectoral projects
has been achieved in raising awareness
of the different elements of a civil society
in a market-oriented economy
· impact of projects attempting to
institutionalise this awareness has been
limited, due to the time frames needed to
influence deep-rooted attitudes towards
social and political models of interaction
· the Democracy programme, part of the
Tacis facilities programme until 1996, has
made a significant contribution to building
democratic structures and the elements of
a civil society
· mainstream projects aimed at
strengthening the capacity of NGOs has
had mixed impact.
 
Facilities
Overall, framework programmes such as
Democracy
(now independent of Tacis) and LIEN make a
positive contribution to the fostering of
a civil society and citizen participation which
is a
significant element towards building
democracy
in the NIS. However, impact varies from
country
to country, often reflecting the degree of
enabling
and political environment for non-
governmental
based activities.
Voluntary Action Support Unit, Russia
Tacis has had mixed impact on the
development of the voluntary sector. This is
in part due to the general lack of legislative
and tax frameworks in the NIS conducive to
the development of a philanthropic basis for
sustaining a voluntary sector. These aspects
were tackled with some success by the
Voluntary Action Support Unit project in
Moscow. This project continues to support
NGOs, legislative change and increased
awareness of such funding concepts as
corporate good citizenship.
7.5. Side Effects
“So it happened that all Tacis programmes are
supervised now by foreign specialists, whose
work is paid at the expense of funds allocated for
our country. Thus Tacis pays (and rather well!) for
the work of its own employees. In fact, Tacis
solves the problem of unemployment in the
European Union by helping us.” Member of the
Federation Council on Economic Policy, Russia
“The ratio between money spent for the
programme itself and for the payment of the
European specialist is 20 to 80; as for us we
would like this money to work for the Russian
economy, especially as we have good specialists
and we could pay them better.” Member of the
Federation Council on Economic Policy, Russia,
quoted in a Russian journal
These quotations above illustrate the kind of
criticisms of the Tacis programme which are
voiced by highly placed public figures in the NIS.
They signal that there are serious misgivings in
the NIS about the benefits of Tacis for the Tacis
partner states. The argument is that the EU rules
on Tacis grant aid ensure that most of the funds
stay in the EU and that therefore the NIS barely
benefits. This argument is appealing but
misleading and false and it is worthwhile to make
that clear in this evaluation.
One hundred percent of Tacis money is paid for
by European tax payers. The analysis in the next
section below indicates that it is true that some 67
per cent of Tacis money is spent in the EU and
thus reverts back, in the year of expenditure, to
GDP in the EU member states. However, the
advice of the EU experts is not given in the EU
states and therefore does not have the potential
to benefit the EU. The advice is given in the NIS
and, unless it proves useless, will increase the
capabilities of the partner organisations and
contribute to productivity/value added in the NIS
countries in subsequent years. In other words,
Tacis assistance, whether in the form of advice or
in the form of equipment, represents a direct
investment for the NIS.
To put a price on the value of this advice is
difficult. In principle, the opportunity cost concept
could be used. This would imply that the value of
EU TA for a country equals the price that the
country would have to pay for EU or local experts
who can deliver the same advice and have the
same impact. In those areas where NIS experts
are available to replace EU experts, Tacis has
evidently no further purpose. What Tacis is
however doing is transferring know-how which is
not available or not accessible in the NIS. If the
contribution of these experts is effective in
providing solutions to problems, then the value of
the expert’s contribution is considerably higher
than the market price for the expert.
A related issue, which is highly relevant to this
evaluation, is the question of whether the cost-
effectiveness and impact of the Tacis programme
can be increased by reducing the total inputs from
EU experts and increasing the inputs of NIS
experts for project management purposes and for
the purpose of streamlining the transfer of know-
how. This issue was raised in all four workshops
as well as in many of the interviews. The general
view was that this would be an improvement for
the future.
Side effects that have been observed by the
Evaluation Team include direct contributions to
GDP in the NIS, market entry for European
Consultants, and the promotion of NIS
consultancy abilities.
An unintended but substantial contribution of
Tacis to GDP in the NIS is represented by the
expenditures of Tacis contractors on NIS goods
and services. The Evaluation Team conducted a
small investigation based on a small sample of 17
contract budgets. The objective was to estimate
the proportion of funds spent in the NIS on goods
and services. Such expenditures represent the
direct value added to NIS economies. This
sample is not representative but it gives an
indication.
The finding is that some 40 per cent of total Tacis
allocations contribute to GDP in the NIS. For the
period 1991-1996, this would amount to some 960
MECU. This sum would be the equivalent of an
annual 0.53 ECU per capita.
Table 7.2. Cost items
Budget item Cost share
highest
Cost share
lowest
Cost share
average
Guestimated
share of NIS
value added7
EU expert fees 60% 45% 55% 10%
NIS staff fees 20% 5% 10% 9%
Direct costs 17% 15% 16% 12%
Reimbursables 8% 5% 7% 3%
Equipment 15% 6% 12% 6%
Total 100% 40%
                                           
7 Corrected for the estimated import share in the spending pattern
As indicated in Part 1, more than 3,900 contract
components8 were awarded during the period
1991-1996. Of these, 3,000 were separate
contracts. A sizeable share of these contracts was
won by well known accountancy firms and by
banks who have a long-term strategy for
expansion in the NIS. There is no doubt that
these contracts have lowered the “transaction
cost wall” for these companies. Tacis contracts
enabled them to become acquainted with the
market at low risk. This has promoted their
establishment in the main regions and countries
in the NIS. The absence of accountancy
companies or western banks in some NIS
countries, such as Georgia and Armenia, is an
indication of the poor investment climate which
still exists in the NIS. Unfortunately, the precise
number of smaller western companies9 which
have established a representative office or an
equity investment in a Russian consultancy
company in Russia or Ukraine is not known.
The Tacis programme has provided thousands of
academics in the NIS with the chance to continue
working as academics and to supplement their
income with Tacis consultancy or research
assignments. A select number of them have
taken the initiative to set up local consultancy
companies. In 1991-1993, these companies or
individual experts were mainly engaged in Tacis
or other donor projects. Increasingly, people who
gained experience in Tacis projects are now
finding highly paid employment in banks and
industries. Due to the current Tacis guidelines,
which restrict the fee levels which Tacis can pay
for local experts, Tacis no longer has access to
the best of these. For this group, the Tacis
experience has given them the attitudes and skills
which are needed for consultancy work in
industry. Their sound academic training
complements these skills and this has the
potential to create highly qualified consultants.
Without a doubt, these consultants have an
added value to offer to Tacis. More use of them
might increase the efficiency and therefore the
impact of Tacis projects. The evaluators believe
that Tacis should consider paying the local
market price for highly qualified experts, even if it
is more than the current upper limit approved in
the current Tacis guidelines for tenders.
7.6. Conclusions
It is no surprise to find that, in common with most
macro-level evaluations of other aid programmes,
                                           
8 As defined in the database - Annex 6.
9 In May 1997, a total of 389 British companies were registered
with the British Embassy in Russia. This is only an indication
of the total number of British companies with permanent
offices in Russia.
this evaluation is able neither to quantify impact
nor categorise it neatly. However, what this
chapter demonstrates is that positive impact is
being achieved at various levels, albeit in varying
degrees.
At sectoral level, Tacis impact can be
demonstrated in some cases, especially where
Tacis has supported the introduction of new
concepts. In both the public and the private
sector, the introduction of new methods and
abilities for meeting new market demand for
private and public sector services has proved
successful.
The Evaluation Team cannot, on the basis of the
work done in this evaluation, draw authoritative
conclusions concerning the global impact of the
Tacis programme in terms of its contribution to
the content and pace of market economy-oriented
reforms and support to democracy in the NIS and
Mongolia. The programme is still too young, and
is on-going, thus preventing a full-scale ex-post
evaluation. Moreover, and this is a more basic
problem, it is widely recognized that a valid
assessment methodology for measuring the
impact of know-how transfer programmes does
not yet exist.
Attitude change: One main strength of Tacis lies
in its people-to-people approach. Tens of
thousands of NIS managers, experts,
administrators (and some politicians) have met
their EU counterparts. They work together on NIS
problems that have arisen in the wake of the
collapse of the former Soviet Union. Especially,
they anticipate they restructuring demands which
the transition to new market-oriented forms make
on NIS public and private organizations as well as
on individuals in top, middle and lower
management levels. This common effort gives a
wider view, leading to a better understanding of
the problems, and facilitating the ways to find
appropriate solutions to new demands.
Policy change: Throughout the NIS, Tacis was,
for a number of sectors, the first major donor to
address policy change issues. In 1991-1992 Tacis
had a degree of influence. TIE interviews in 1997
with senior government officials and policy
makers confirm that, without Tacis support, the
development of policy-making and
implementation would have developed more
slowly in a number of key sectors, including new
legislation; deregulation of the markets,
privitisation instruments, enterprise restructuring
methodologies, trade and customs and nuclear
safety. In recent years, Tacis impact on actual
policy-change decision-making and on budget
allocations for implementation has been less
successful than anticipated and targeted. The
explanation may be sought in the virtual absence
of a sustained high-level policy dialogue between
the Commission and the NIS Governments, and,
generally, the limited access of project staff and
project policy documents to high-level decision-
makers.
Institution-building: The large majority of
projects (87%) have been well targeted at the
needs of the selected POs and/or beneficiaries.
The data indicate that in 75% of the Tacis
portfolio, NIS staff capabilities increased and the
POs developed new capacity for dealing with
problems addressed. It can be expected that this
will have a positive impact on the future
economic performance of the partners. Tacis
impact in this field was greatest when it targeted
the needs of new private and public sector
institution and the new capabilities needed by
existing institutions in areas such as migration
policy, customs, taxation, small and medium size
enterprise centres, commercial and central
banking and employment services. In the field of
restructuring of existing organizations, the
resistance to change has so far limited
Tacis’impact.
Training: The evidence shows that training can
be considered the most important and most
appreciated form of assistance. The impact from
the range of training activities is large.
Management training is found to be one of the
more successful tools for policy support. Tacis
contributed to the emergence of public and some
viable private sector training centres and the
experience with workshops and study tours
proved highly valuable in supporting the attitude
change processes. The impact on education
policies, however, cannot be assessed yet.
Concrete results were also achieved in training of
trainers, and curricula development.
Democracy, civil society, welfare and
environment: The evaluators consider that the
content of the Tacis programme has so far not
reflected the fact that reinforcing democracy is
one of the two Tacis programme objectives and
does not present an adequate response to the
practical importance of Third Pillar issues of the
Maastricht Treaty (Justice and Home Affairs) in
the EU/NIS relationship. A comprehensive policy
for dealing with democratic issues is
conspicuously absent. Nevertheless, the
evaluation shows that the impact of Tacis on
democracy in the NIS extends beyond the impact
of the relatively few projects started up under the
Tacis democracy programme. The evaluators
conclude that in most sectors, Tacis projects
contribute to attitude changes to institutional
capacity developments which have a positive
democracy-reinforcing significance.
On welfare issues, Tacis was one of the first
donors dealing with the provision of services
through NGOs, the transfer of social security
responsibilities from the privatised industries back
to the public sector and the social consequences
of sector and enterprise restructuring. Tacis
impact in promoting environmental awareness in
its project partners is found to be virtually non-
existent.
Side-effects: Tacis has lowered the threshold for
EU business and consultancy companies to set
up offices in the NIS, and has provided a
substantial incentive for the development of
domestic consultancy capacity in the NIS. In
addition, a rough estimate indicates that some
40% of overall Tacis finance are spent directly on
NIS goods and services. The other 60% consist
mainly of the fees for EU experts who provide
their services in and for the benefit of the partner
states.
The evaluators conclude that Tacis is more than
the sum of its project results. On the basis of the
available monitoring evidence, the workshops and
the interviews, it can be concluded that Tacis has
had an impact on a number of change processes
which are important for the further evolution of
the market economy anddemocracy in the NIS
and Mongolia.
Chapter 8 Project Cycle Management and Tacis
staffing
8.1 Introduction
From the beginning, staffing for the Tacis
Programme within the Commission has been
minimal for a Technical Assistance programme of
this size. Despite this, Tacis management has
succeeded in mounting an operational
programme which has evolved over time and can
now be considered relatively mature in terms of
procedures and its ability to generate satisfactory
project results. Management and staff deserve
recognition for this achievement.
At the same time, Tacis has attracted not only
praise but also a notable amount of criticism, for
a programme with a positive mandate and a
relatively short history. In some cases, the
criticism is not well founded, but in many cases it
is. The criticism comes both from ill-informed and
well-informed sources, including the European
Court of Auditors, NIS partners, partner
organisations, contractors, the media and sources
within the European Parliament, the Commission,
DG1A itself and the Member States through the
Tacis Committee.
It would be unprofessional if this evaluation did
not examine these criticisms, both positive and
negative. This chapter reviews the successes and
weaknesses of Tacis Project Cycle Management.
The material was distilled, on the one hand, from
the Evaluation Team’s investigation of the
performance of some 64 case studies and, on the
other, from suggestions for improving
implementation efficiency made to the Evaluation
Team by interviewees in the NIS and in the
Commission. Although the organisation and
administration of Tacis per se falls outside the
scope of this evaluation, these issues are
pertinent to the overall implementation efficiency
of the Tacis Programme. Thus, improvements in
this field can make a positive contribution to
Tacis’ overall effectiveness and impact.
8.2 Strengths and weaknesses
The following strengths of the Project
Management Cycle will be discussed:
· a well-defined project cycle and clear
procedures;
· project budgets are linked to objectives rather
than to tasks;
· the inception phase provides the necessary
flexibility;
· the monitoring programme promotes
effectiveness and efficiency.
The following weaknesses have been identified:
· backlogs in programming make the project
preparation phase too lengthy;
· the project partners are not sufficiently
involved in project preparation,
implementation and management;
· Task Managers do not respond to signals from
the field in a timely manner;
· delays in project start-up are a regular feature;
· equipment purchase and delivery are often
associated with friction and delays;
· there are difficulties in the final phase of
projects implementation;
· different delivery mechanisms at times pursue
similar project objectives;
· there is insufficient feedback of experience to
programming and dissemination of outputs.
Strengths
Tacis has established a well-defined project cycle
management system with reasonably clear tools
and procedures for project identification, project
formulation, tendering and contracting, project
implementation and progress reporting by
contractors, implementation monitoring and final
reporting and invoicing. Nevertheless,
implementation efficiency could be improved by
utilising better the project management
mechanisms and procedures created by Tacis.
In most cases, the Terms of Reference in Tacis
tenders do not provide instructions on how to
implement a project. The TOR usually only clarify
the project context, the function of the identified
partner organisation, the main project purpose
(immediate objective), the expected outputs from
the contractor and the available maximum
budget. It is the job of the tenderer to propose a
feasible approach for realising the planned
outputs and for promoting the achievement of the
stated objective within the available budget
amount. The practice in more standard
development aid programmes relies more on a
process approach, or PPPPP (proper planning
prevents poor performance). Projects and
budgets in these cases are prepared on the basis
of detailed TORs and phased workplans which
specify the tasks and required activities before
financing is approved. Funds are then released in
separate phases depending on the progress
made. The focus on objectives has made Tacis
projects flexible in changing work methods and
activities in response to changing circumstances
and country needs.
To compensate for its relatively unstructured
programming and project formulation procedures,
Tacis introduced two new aspects to project cycle
management: the inception phase of projects and
the Tacis monitoring programme. The inception
phase enables contractors and project partners to
respond to changes in the project environment
which, as Tacis practice shows, very often occur
between project formulation and project start-up.
The Tacis start-up phase ends with an Inception
Report which brings the project up-to-date,
outlines the project strategy in the project
synopsis and provides the plan of operations for
the whole project period and the workplan for the
coming six months.
A project monitoring programme was set up and
implemented from 1993 onwards. This
programme ensures that each project amounting
to more than 300.000 ECU is visited two or three
times a year by a team of two monitors (one EU
and one national monitor). Their task is to assess
project performance and to make
recommendations on actions by the key-actors in
the project in order to increase cost-effectiveness.
In August 1996, the monitoring programme was
reviewed and it was shown to be a useful tool for:
(i) controlling and disciplining contractors; (ii)
providing Task Managers with timely information
on project implementation problems; and (iii) for
providing on-site project facilitating services
(solving problems on the ground) for all key
actors. The last point was an unintended result
which proved valuable in compensating for the
light management structure which had been
developed on the ground in the NIS. The
programme has drawn criticism, however,
concerning the limited time available for
monitoring visits on-site (two days). A second
criticism is that it is mainly a management tool for
Task Managers and is not fully used by the Heads
of Units and top management of Tacis. While it is
not suggested that higher levels should become
involved at the level of detail of monitoring
reports, the structure and content of the Monthly
Management Reports should be reviewed to
make the information more useful for the
hierarchy for project portfolio management
purposes and for feedback of lessons learned
from motoring into the programming cycle.
Weaknesses
The approach to TOR formulation and budgeting
was chosen in 1992 with the intention of reducing
the two-year time lags between project
identification and the start of implementation, a
time-scale viewed as the norm for some
multilateral and bilateral donors. Tacis was to be
given the ability to mobilise support quickly. In
practice, this advantage was largely lost after
1992 because of the lengthy Indicative and Action
Programme approval procedures and the backlog
in annual programming with which Commission
staff implementing Tacis have struggled for
years. Most TOR are outdated even before the
tenderers make their bids and strategy proposals.
Nonetheless, contracts are signed, confirming the
technical proposal of the consultant. As a result of
this, when the contractor and the project partner
finally meet, it is not uncommon to discover that
their approaches to project strategy differ
considerably. Reports on the inception phase of
projects prepared by the monitoring teams have
shown that this is a serious problem. Some Task
Managers have taken notice of the problem and
have taken appropriate action. However, a
systematic improvement has not been observed.
The evaluators note from the monitoring reports,
workshops and interviews that there is wide
agreement that Project partners are not
sufficiently involved in the formulation of the TOR
and have very little rights vis-à-vis the contractor
in the management of the project. As in other
grant funded TA programmes, the POs are not
informed about the financial details of the budget.
In addition, in many cases, they have had little
insight into the use of budget resources and on
balances remaining in respect of physical inputs
from the contractor, equipment and training.
Formally their rights are limited to endorsement of
the Inception Report. These practices limit the
“ownership” of the project by the partner
organisations, their commitment to the project
and their contribution to the project objectives. In
this connection, the Evaluation Team notes that
there is a weakness in the relations between the
three main project parties. A statement of
endorsement links the PO with the TM. A contract
regulates the relations between the TM and the
contractor. However, there is no formal
agreement between contractors and POs on
project implementation. In some projects, the
POs or contractors have insisted on such a “Joint
Project Management” between themselves and
this is on record as having had a positive
influence on the transparency of co-operation
within the project.
Contractors and monitors often signal a lack of
adequate response from the Commission
services in their reports. This is considered to be
one of the main reasons for delays in progress,
for inefficient use of the budget and contractual
time and for time extension problems.
The period between the mobilisation of
contractors and the submission of the first
workplan in the Inception Report generally
exceeds the two-month period prescribed in the
“Tacis guidelines on administrative reporting”. To
compensate for this time loss, contracts are
usually extended by a side letter for, on average,
an additional three months. While this practice
does not increase the budget costs, it reduces the
resources available for the implementation and
completion phases of the Tacis project cycle and
is therefore detrimental to the quality of the
project results.
The tendering regulations on equipment are
difficult to implement in the NIS, especially
because the legal basis for Tacis operations in
the NIS is not well regulated (see also Chapter 9).
Moreover the system lacks flexibility which, at
times, creates insurmountable problems. For the
Nuclear safety sector in particular, where there is
a big equipment supply component, the number
of suppliers is sometimes very limited or only one
supplier exists. The Commission services do not
have a suitable procedure for handling this issue
and this results sometimes in endless delays.
Monitoring experience shows that, in a large
percentage of the projects, effectiveness could
have been higher if more attention had been
given to disseminating the results of the project to
a wider audience and/or extending the project to
allow for a better utilisation of the results by the
project partners. In other instances, projects are
observed to have ended prematurely in the sense
that a project extension would have allowed for a
better utilisation of the results by the project
partners.
In this context, the evaluators would like to signal
that the duration of Tacis contracts is short and,
for a considerable share of the contracts,
extension requests for time and additional
budgets are processed each year. In a number of
cases, contracting procedures do not allow further
budget extensions. Projects come to an abrupt
stop although, objectively speaking, continuation
would make sense and would be cost-effective.
There are a number of cases on record where
projects, initiated or co-financed by LIEN, ESSN,
PCP or FFTF, have had similar or more
significant effects on their partner organisations
than the much larger, regular Tacis projects. This
seems to support an argument which was put
forward in different monitoring reports namely
that contractors’ workplans are sometimes more
determined by available budget resources than by
the objective needs of the project for inputs from
the contractor. This touches on an old issue in
technical co-operation: payment to contractors is
not linked to objectively verifiable performance,
but to presence in the field and ill-defined
deliverables. It would make more sense if the
POs were formally consulted by the TM at the
time of project approval and were accorded the
right and obligation to express their views on
project reports and outputs delivered by
contractors. This could, for example, have a
positive disciplining influence on the performance
of contractors.
Although the Commission has gained substantial
field experience in the NIS and insight into the
bottlenecks in the transition and the development
process that are ongoing in the NIS, they have
not fully capitalised on this. A systematic review
of performance with the purpose of drawing
lessons for the future and feedback into
programming has not been undertaken. In this
respect, the sector reviews which are regularly
prepared by the monitoring service do provide
some insight but this is mainly restricted to the
project preparation and implementation process
itself. Insight into policy issues and the
appropriateness of programming have not been
analysed nor has there been a systematic review
of the projects with the purpose of identifying
suitable project approaches, methodologies and
outputs for replication and dissemination.
The establishment of the Evaluation Unit, which
has been operational since January 1997, is a
positive step towards overcoming this weakness.
Without feedback, the Tacis Programme and
project management cycles are not complete. If
programme and project design is not able to build
on previous experience, then the programme
remains, at best, static in terms of effectiveness.
8.3 Tacis staffing issues
An example of Tacis-staff time pressures
A good Task Manager is dedicated. He/she feels
and is a Tacis veteran after one year on the job,
works 10 hours a day, mainly on programming,
tendering and contracting issues. He/she can
meet with you briefly between 6 and 8 p.m. in the
office and has virtually no time to discuss the
substance of the projects. The worst that can
happen to him/her is the receipt of a monitoring
report that shows that one of his/her projects
should be stopped to prevent more money being
wasted. His/her reaction: “Please, do you know
what this means. My Head of Unit will ask me
what I am going to do with the remaining money
and I will have to start up another project. I have
no time for that. I will find a solution within the
context of the existing contract”.
According to senior Commission officials, staff
turnover is very high by Commission standards.
Although the example above shows that this is
understandable, it nevertheless results in a
significant loss of experience and it limits the
development of a corporate memory.
New Tacis staff would benefit from more training
in best practices for project implementation. The
majority of staff in the operational units are
young, intelligent and prepared to work very hard,
but have virtually no relevant previous experience
with project management and no practical project
implementation experience. This limits their
abilities. The Evaluation Team signals the need
for introducing training in project management.
Poor projects are rarely terminated. Exact data
are not available but the monitoring teams
estimate that, in total, approximately 10 projects
were terminated on account of poor performance.
This compares with some 80 projects which
continued their life until the end of the formal
contract duration and which were assessed by the
monitors as having failed (4 per cent of the total
portfolio).
A large proportion of the weaknesses outlined
above are, in one way or another, related to the
limited staff resources available in the operational
units of Tacis. The Evaluation Team therefore
concludes that, in hindsight, it would have been
wiser if, right from the start of the programme, the
Commission had created more staff posts for the
Tacis Programme or had shifted posts from other
parts of the Commission to DG1A. The limited
number of permanent officials in the programme
can be seen as one of the main reasons for the
relatively low implementation efficiency and this,
again, is one of the causes for the criticism of
Tacis.
The strategy of the Commission for overcoming
the manpower problem has been to recruit
experts on fixed-term contracts, within strict
budget limitations, for project portfolio
management tasks and for supporting
programming and project management tasks.
This has caused difficulties with other
Commission services such as Financial Control,
and with the Court of Auditors and the European
Parliament where these practices are viewed as a
dilution of the role of permanent officials. Some
measures have been introduced to increase
staffing at headquarters and in the field, but these
have been difficult and slow to implement, and
not of a scope likely to bring substantial
improvement.
Although the manpower strategy has been
understandable for a new programme and has,
subsequently, alleviated part of the manpower
shortages, it cannot and should not be considered
a normal state of affairs. Bringing in new staff
with new expertise can be an advantage but this
advantage can be outweighed by the short
contract durations for these staff. An issue in this
context is that the proper introduction and
supervision of new staff in the Tacis operational
units implies an extra burden for the permanent
staff on the Tacis Programme. This may explain
why initial training is not done very systematically.
In general, the lack of staff resources is acute in
the operational units and this is a factor, in part,
explaining the limited attention to content and to
supervision of project quality.
8.4 Conclusions
The first conclusion is that DG1A/C has an
insufficient staff to carry out the functions
expected of it. The second conclusion is that
Tacis management would benefit from reducing
the use of hired consultants as Task Managers,
functions which require generalist/managers
rather than specialised expertise. To solve the
problems of staffing, any attempts to reallocate
existing staff resources would not appear to be an
appropriate course of action. In essence, it would
seem that the issue can only be handled by the
creation of new staff posts.
Project cycle management procedures are
adequate but are not utilised to their full potential.
The procedures are not consistently applied.
Training in this area is of critical importance.
Overall programme efficiency can be increased
by more training for members of the professional
staff in the operational units in project
management skills. This would also contribute to
creating a greater appreciation of the vital link
between partner organisation performance and
commitment and project effectiveness and
impact.
There is a need for a new manual on
management procedures, guidelines and best
practices aimed at increasing the POs’ sense of
responsibility for their projects. In particular, these
responsibilities should cover:
· reinforcement of the role of the statement of
endorsement as an instrument for clarifying
the rights and obligations of the partner
organisations;
· joint drafting of the project terms of reference
with the PO;
· updating the TOR in the weeks prior to the
tender with information from the PO and the
Co-ordinating Unit;
· signing of the inception reports, progress
reports and endorsement of the final report by
the PO.
The evaluators consider that the Commission
through its Tacis and Phare programmes has
gained considerable expertise over the past six
years, and it is the right time systematically to
review successes and weakness and to identify,
in both the Tacis and Phare programmes, the
projects and outputs which can be used for
replication and dissemination. Given the
differences in the pace of reform in the different
sectors and countries, initiatives which can
promote the exchange of experience and learning
from experience between the NIS partners
deserve priority in the coming years.
Chapter 9 Transparency and accountability
9.1 Introduction
The Tacis Programme operates within the general
frameworks for administration, financial control,
accounting and auditing set by the Commission
for DG1 and the Council Regulations on Tacis.
In this chapter, the performance of the
programme with respect to transparency and
accountability is reviewed. Transparency refers
here to the clarity of processes and information
flows required for decision-making. Accountability
refers to the extent to which implementation is in
accordance with operational guidelines that have
been adopted.
9.2 Transparency
Transparency issues are important for the many
different stakeholders in the programme, in
particular the NCs, the POs, who are the main
users of the project outputs, the contractors and
the public at large.
Tacis National Co-ordinators and Directors of
Co-ordinating Units
Tacis provides no information on the process and
factors which determine the global allocation of
the annual Tacis funds across the different
countries nor across the different delivery
mechanisms (such as national programmes,
interstate/regional programmes and facilities).
Once the global allocations are known, the NCs
and Directors of the CUs of the partner states are
informed and the annual programming cycle
starts. The programming process is co-ordinated
by Task Managers who are assigned as Tacis
Country Co-ordinators. They organise the
consultation process with the Tacis National
Country Co-ordinators in the partner states (who
are often positioned at the deputy ministerial
level). The latter are supported by CUs in the NIS
to which a number of EU experts are seconded to
provide assistance.
For this evaluation, a number of NCs and/or their
national CU staff directors were interviewed on a
range of issues, including their views on the
transparency of Tacis. As could be expected, the
answers were similar. These are summarised
below.
With the exception of Russia, the NCs and/or the
Directors of the CUs are satisfied with the amount
of influence their countries or their organisation
have had on:
· the selection of priority fields for indicative
programming and annual programming;
· the identification and selection of projects for
Tacis funding;
· the formulation of the first draft of the TOR for
national programme projects;
· the selection of the project partner
organisations, even if the final selection is
often done by the Task Manager on the basis
of information from experts engaged to finalise
the TOR.
The view is held in Russia that Tacis project
selection does not sufficiently reflect the priorities
of the country. The formal response to this is that
any programme requires the signature of the NC,
normally a First Deputy Prime Minister, following
intense discussion with the Russian side at
working level. If the Russian government is
dissatisfied with the results of the selection, then
the obligation to take corrective action rests first
with them.
They are fairly satisfied with the quality of the
information flows from Brussels and between
Brussels and themselves on:
· general Tacis Programme information;
· decisions taken in Brussels on project closure,
extension or follow up;
· information exchange on project management
issues;
· tendering status and contracting.
They consider that they are not sufficiently
consulted on:
· the TOR for interstate projects;
· the menu of the Tacis facilities offered to their
countries.
The question of transparent procedures followed
by the CUs in project selection arises here. While
it is agreed that the CUs will make the first
selection from project applications in keeping with
the objectives and aims of the IPs, there is
generally no clear process or set criteria by which
this initial selection is made. Considering that this
initial selection typically reduces project
applications by three-quarters, the question is of
some importance. In response to this issue, the
Delegation and the CU in Russia have introduced
the use of a project appraisal sheet, in order to
regularise the process, increase transparency and
ensure that project selection is in line with IP
objectives.
Partner organisations and contractors
The Commission services have developed a
transparent set of project cycle management
instruments for use by Tacis, including:
· the Statement of Endorsement which the
partner organisations prepare and which
serves to confirm their rights and obligations in
the context of the project;
· the Tendering bidding and tender evaluation
procedures including interviews with the
potential contractors to which the PO
representatives participate as voting
members;
· the administrative guidelines for progress
reporting by contractors and monitoring which
provide information on the implementation of
most Tacis projects.
POs participating in the workshops during this
evaluation have indicated a number of areas
where they see scope for further improvements in
Tacis Programme transparency. The project
formulation process is not very transparent to the
POs. In the past, they were often consulted
mainly with respect to the first drafts of the TOR.
Although formally they expressed their agreement
by signing the Statement of Endorsement, they
felt that their views were not sufficiently reflected.
The POs have little insight into the budget of the
contractor, which complicates their ability to play
the role of equal partners in the management of
the project. During implementation, the feedback
from the Commission about programme issues
raised in progress reports is considered
satisfactory but slow. Reasons given for decisions
about requests for project extensions are not
always well communicated or produced in a
timely manner. Such delays and
misunderstandings have been known to cause
confusion and controversy in the final stages of
projects.
Contractors present at the workshops raised some
issues. In particular, information on the results of
the evaluation process is not systematically
provided and recourse for settling disagreements
with the Commission is weak, and, in general,
presents such a barrier that complaints can be
pursued only at very high costs (in terms of
efforts).
The Public at large
The public information documentation produced
by Tacis on its programming, tendering, content
of the programme, budget allocations and the like
is of the highest quality.10 However, while EU
industry has a clear picture of Tacis activities, the
EU public is not generally acquainted with what
Tacis does. At the same time, there is no clear
image of Tacis objectives and activities in the NIS
countries. In addition, the rumours about bad
project performance are not countered by the
dissemination of information about successful
project performance. Neither is there evidence of
any effective public relations strategy to respond
to negative criticisms.
9.3 Accountability
The key question when assessing accountability
is whether the Tacis Programme is implemented
in accordance with the guidelines which govern its
operations. In this respect, the Commission and
Tacis management are accountable to different
organisations for different aspects of their
operations. The main ones are:
· EU organisations controlling the Commission –
the Court of Auditors, the European
Parliament and the Council of Ministers;
· internal services of the Commission –
including Financial Control;
· the “Tacis Management Committee” which is
composed of representatives of the Member
States and is chaired by a Commission
representative. According to the Council
Regulations, the Committee delivers an
opinion of which the Commission has to take
account before adopting financing decisions.
These organisations play a role of “corporate
governance” similar to that of shareholders in
companies, but with one noticeable difference:
shareholders tend to pursue a common “profit”
goal while, in the case of Tacis, the above listed
organisations have their own mandates, interests
and tasks which are linked to accountability rather
than to efficiency.
The Evaluation Team has noted that these
organisations monitor the activities of Tacis
closely and critically and have had an important
influence on the modifications which have been
made over time to the Council Regulations on
Tacis.
It is not surprising that the Tacis units responsible
for programming, contracting and financial
procedures have responded to this disciplinary
scrutiny by introducing procedures to further
tighten the operational framework in which the
                                           
10 During interviews with the CU in Russia, it was observed that
the Russian translation of information documents was poor.
This would need to be professionally verified.
programme has to be implemented. The
Evaluation Team makes the observation that
some of the complaints directed at Tacis originate
from the NIS and focus on the lack of concern in
the Commission on cost-effectiveness issues.
The Evaluation Team shares these concerns.
Issues of accountability appear to be more
important to the Commission than effectiveness
and efficiency. This is understandable since the
Commission uses tax payers’ money for which it
is accountable. On the other hand, accountability
should not become a constraint on effectiveness
and efficiency. The Evaluation Team concludes
that, in the last two years, this is exactly what has
happened.
Increasingly slow contracting and payment
procedures are an important element in this
adverse development and are creating serious
problems for contractors. It is not unusual for
contractors, who have agreed in principle with the
Commission to an extension of a project, to be
faced with the question of whether to stay on at
personal cost to avoid the wasteful expense of
demobilising and then remobilising. Slow
payment procedures are commonly known to
close down the operations of smaller companies
which cannot sustain the cash flow demands.
9.4 Legal issues
Tacis operations are currently subject to local
national law, which means that in strict legal
terms, the Commission’s conditions for
contractors do not apply for contractors operating
in certain NIS. In some NIS, the general rules and
regulations referred to in the Financing
Memoranda, which were developed and
negotiated during the start-up phase of the
programme, are now outdated and cannot be
enforced. In Russia, Armenia and some other
countries, governments have decided that the
approval process for international agreements
has to be followed. Ratification by parliament is
part of the process but this may take years to
accomplish. In the intervening period, the validity
of the latest Action Programmes is placed in
doubt.
The contractors are the victims of this unclear
situation. As long as Tacis has no recognised
legal status in the NIS, contractors cannot legally
register their project operations. This complicates
project-related imports, the operation of bank
accounts and personal tax liability, to mention just
a few of the difficulties. This has had a negative
effect on the working conditions of EU experts
and on the process of equipment imports. The EU
stipulation that Tacis cannot pay VAT and import
taxes conflicts with the absence of tax exemption
status for Tacis in the NIS and creates import
clearing problems throughout the programme.
The evaluation indicates that this issue requires a
solution which can only be reached by high level
negotiations between the Commission and its NIS
partners. Such negotiations would need to result
in special presidential degrees as well as
parliamentary ratification.
9.5 Conclusions
The Tacis Programme performs well on some
transparency issues. The quality of public
information material on annual programming,
budget allocations for countries and projects and
tendering reached a high standard early on in the
programme. Likewise, the tendering process is
transparent and accountable. The publications
from the Tacis information service are useful but
somehow Tacis still has an image problem. A
weak point is that the POs in the NIS are not
adequately informed about project budgets and
about the reasons for project contract
management decisions.
Tacis performance providing information on
achievements and feedback to the Tacis
Management Committee can be assessed as
relatively weak. Negative comments from the
Committee are on record concerning the
information content of reports submitted to them
as reviews of Tacis performance. As a response
to the Commission’s Sound and Effective
Management Initiative (SEM 2000), which
stipulates the needs for annual progress reviews,
a new Evaluation Unit became operational in
early 1997. SEM 2000 mandates the conduct of
systematic, timely and rigorous evaluations of the
programmes for which DG1A is responsible. This
can be considered as a positive step towards a
more systematic approach to the provision of
evaluation information about the programme.
Tacis has been put under pressure from different
quarters to further improve accountability and
raise it to acceptable standards. The Evaluation
Team cannot assess the performance of the
programme on this issue since this falls within the
competence of the Court of Auditors. It is
observed, however, that the increasing emphasis
on accountability and financial control has created
working conditions/procedures which, in practice,
contradict with the flexibility needed for the
effectiveness and efficiency of project
implementation.
The mounting criticism of Tacis should be treated
as a warning to Tacis management. The
programme has evolved and become more
mature but, at the same time, it has become
more bureaucratic, with tighter procedures
leading to more attention and concern for
accountability than for efficiency. Here, the
evaluation signals a problem with the 1996
Financial Regulation. The latter includes articles
which aim to guarantee equal opportunity access
to tendering. However, the effect is to prohibit the
Commission from treating “working experience”
as a positive factor in the tendering process. This
regulation, if applied rigorously, may become a
further factor contributing to implementation
inefficiencies. A typical example relates to
projects in which institution-building objectives
are of importance, a field where there has been
and will be increasingly more projects.
In this field, contractors have to make substantial
additional efforts to understand and become
familiar with the contexts of institutions in which
they work. In these circumstances, it is usual to
envisage long- rather than short-term contracts.
The Tacis obligation to re-tender every year or
two years is, in itself, inefficient and not cost-
effective. The tendency to exclude highly
performing contractors even from shortlisting
further undermines cost-ineffectiveness.
Part 3 – Relevance, Conclusions and
Recommendations
Chapter 10Overall Relevance
10.1 Introduction
The Tacis Programme is the largest single
programme for know-how transfer to the NIS in
the territory of the former Soviet Union. In
assessing the relevance of the programme, the
evaluation has taken a number of factors into
account.
· world-wide know-how transfer is recognised as
being difficult to carry out and often
experiences a low rate of success;
· the complexity and diversity of the programme
environment in the NIS partner countries were
virtually unknown when the programme started
in 1991;
· the structural and systemic problems resulting
from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
collapse of its internal market were not
understood, nor was the complexity of the
transition process involved.
The chapter starts with a summary of the main
findings of the criteria used in this evaluation for
assessing relevance and concludes with the
overall assessment of the Evaluation Team.
10.2 Performance against the
evaluation criteria
Appropriateness of programming
The idea behind Tacis is good. Technical
assistance in the form of know-how transfer is
very much needed in the NIS and Mongolia. The
evaluation team concludes that, in 1991 as well
as in 1997, it is appropriate for the EU to provide
technical assistance rather than financial
assistance.
The EU/Tacis Programme lacks a clear identity
with respect to the specific policy objectives for
which it stands in the countries and priority fields
identified for support. Moreover, coherent
strategies for promoting the two Tacis
Programme
objectives, market oriented reforms and the
reinforcement of democracy, are largely absent.
On the NIS side, there is also room for improving
the process of identifying and setting the priorities
for multilateral and bilateral assistance in general
and for Tacis assistance in particular.
For the country national programmes, the
indicative programming process generates
programme components in the priority fields
which meet the apparent needs of the Tacis
partner states in the NIS. However, in the
absence of a systematic PSIP process in the NIS
and in the absence of clear EU Tacis policy
reflecting EU interests, it is not possible to assess
the quality of the outcome of the programming
process. Tacis has made various attempts to
focus its programme on a limited number of
priorities and issues. The effect of programming
guidelines issued by DG1A/C1 on the subject has
been largely cosmetic. As a result, Tacis activities
are spread very widely.
Tacis performs relatively well in translating these
IP priorities into Action Programme projects.
These are found to be generally appropriate in the
sense that they target important issues for the
POs and users of the project outputs.
Effectiveness and Impact
The programme can be credited with a positive
record on project effectiveness. The large
majority of the projects are on record as having
achieved their planned outputs and as being likely
to achieve the targeted objectives. The latter is a
necessary but not conclusive indicator for the
tentative conclusion drawn by the Evaluation
Team that Tacis is likely to have a positive
impact in terms of contributing to market-oriented
reform.
There are also indications of some positive
impact in terms of reinforcing democracy, as
evidenced in the theme paper on the impact of
democracy prepared for this evaluation. A
separate, full evaluation of the Democracy
Programme is currently underway.
Implementation Efficiency
Tacis has established a well defined project cycle
management system with reasonably clear
procedures for project identification, project
formulation, tendering and contracting, project
implementation and progress reporting by
contractors, implementation monitoring, final
reporting and invoicing. Nevertheless,
implementation efficiency can be improved by
utilising these procedures better.
The Commission does not have enough staff
resources to utilise existing tools to their full
potential and thereby ensure efficiency in
accordance with increasingly tight financial and
management requirements.
Transparency
The Tacis Programme performs well on most
transparency issues and has developed a
transparent set of project cycle management
instruments. The quality of public information
material on annual programming, budget
allocations for countries and projects and
tendering reached high standards early on in the
programme. Likewise the tendering process itself
is transparent and accountable in its set up.
The publications from the Tacis information
service are useful. A weak point is that the POs in
the NIS are not adequately informed about project
budgets and about the reasons for project
contract management decisions.
Tacis performance in providing information on
achievements and feedback to the ‘Committee”
can be assessed as relatively weak. Negative
comments from the ‘Committee’ are on record
concerning the information content of reports
submitted to them as reviews of Tacis
performance. However, the new Evaluation Unit,
which became operational in early 1997, is
considered a positive step towards a more
systematic approach to the provision of
evaluation information on the achievements of
the programme.
Accountability
The Tacis Regulations of 1991 and 1993 served
their main purposes well. The 1996 Regulation
seems adequate and flexible enough to
accommodate the further evolution of the
programme for the period 1996-1999, though it
has added a further layer of financial and
procedural control which affects productivity. The
regulations have set a workable framework for the
evolution of the Tacis Programme.
The EC context in which Tacis operates has been
exerting increasing pressure on Tacis to further
improve accountability to acceptable standards.
The Evaluation Team cannot assess the
programme’s performance on this issue, which is
in the competence of the Court of Auditors.
The tightening of financial procedures and
contracting procedures creates tension between
concerns over accountability against concerns
over cost-effectiveness.
The mounting criticism of Tacis from the NIS side
on its performance relative to cost-effectiveness
should be treated as a warning to Tacis
management not to create an even more mature
bureaucratic system which shows little concern
for cost-effectiveness.
10.3 Overall conclusion
Taking the above findings into account, the
Evaluation Team concludes that:
· Tacis is making a relevant contribution to its
programme objectives. This has occurred
despite the slower than expected and less than
desired progress in the NIS towards free and
open democratic systems and market-oriented
economic systems;
· the relevance of Tacis is limited by
shortcomings in terms of implementation
efficiency, some aspects of transparency and
an increasing emphasis on accountability and
financial control. Some of these shortcomings
stem from the corporate culture within the
European Commission, in which Tacis is
embedded. Other EU institutions have
required changes in direction or additional
controls but the Commission has lacked the
resources to respond promptly and efficiently;
· the programme can be credited with a positive
record on project effectiveness in achieving
the intended objectives. For the Evaluation
Team, this tips the balance of the final
assessment on the Tacis Programme to the
positive side.
Chapter 11Recommendations
The evaluation shows that the Tacis Programme
can be credited with a moderate degree of
success in terms of realised outputs and
effectiveness in achieving the intended objectives
and impact. This report, however, contains some
conclusions and recommendations which aim at
increasing the effectiveness, impact and overall
relevance of the programme. Most of the
recommendations here are derived from the
findings of the evaluation; others draw on the
experience and reactions of the Evaluation Team
to the findings.
11.1 Programming
The demand-driven principle underlying the Tacis
Programme, however,justified in the early years,
has weakened the impact of Tacis. Neither the
beneficiaries in the NIS formulating the demand,
nor the Commission responding to the demand,
were able clearly to define strategies placing such
demands in the wider context of transition. As the
PCAs come into force, the opportunity exists to
replace the demand-driven principle by the
dialogue-driven principle which is enshrined in the
PCA approach.
Recommendation 1: To capitalise on entry
into force of the PCAs to give the Tacis
Programme political guidance and greater
effectiveness. The PCA machinery could be
used to elaborate strategy in the sectors in
which Tacis operates. This would raise the
profile of Tacis, and ensure a higher level of
NIS ownership of Tacis actions. This is vital
for successful and lasting impact. Tacis
should also be used to support NIS
involvement in the dialogue thus instituted
under the PCA.
The Evaluation Team believes that Tacis
programming can be better targeted to reflect the
mutual interests of the NIS and the EU as defined
through the policy dialogue instituted under the
PCA. This can be streamlined and co-ordinated
with other donors by further policy development
and support for building up Public Investment
Planning capability in the NIS.
Recommendation 2: The Commission should
develop a clear – and for the partner states –
recognisable EU/Tacis position on the policy
objectives it wishes to pursue in selected
priority areas.
On the NIS side, there is room for improving the
process of identifying and setting the priorities for
multilateral and bilateral assistance in general,
and for Tacis assistance in particular. The current
system of involving Co-ordinating Units as
facilitators for mobilising needs in the partner
states has practical merit. However, this falls
short when compared with the practice of Public
Sector Investment Programmes (PSIP) linked
with public expenditure reviews, as recommended
by the IMF and the World Bank, and as
implemented with EU Phare support in various
countries seeking accession to the EU.
Recommendation 3: To give priority to
developing in the NIS the ability to
programme donor resources, and Tacis, in
accordance with the Public Investment
Programme approach. This includes: i) the
perspective of utilising PSIP priorities as the
basis for Tacis programming as soon as
feasible, thus simplifying the Tacis
programming cycle and reducing the share of
Tacis budget and staff time resources utilised
for this purpose and ii) progressively shift
Tacis coordination from the CU to a PSIP-
based approach.
The 1996 Regulation raised the reinforcement of
democracy as the second objective of the Tacis
Programme. However, neither the 1993 nor the
1996 Regulation gives concrete guidance on this
issue. The Evaluation team considers that, so far,
Tacis has failed to reflect the fact that
reinforcement of democracy is a programme
objective, nor has its level of support been
appropriate, considering how important third pillar
issues (justice and home affairs) are becoming in
the relations between the EU and the NIS.
Recommendation 4: to formulate the EU/Tacis
policy goals for reinforcing democracy, and to
design a comprehensive Tacis
implementation strategy with practical
programming guidelines to promote
democracy.
The Evaluation Team believes that the quality of
Tacis actions suffers from a failure to draw on
best Tacis practice and the experience of other
actors in the TA field. A more coherent use of
Tacis monitoring and evaluation findings, and a
systematic exchange of experience, would ensure
more effective programme implementation.
Recommendation 5: Enhance policy and
quality assurance, drawing on the experience
of those implementingboth Phare and Tacis
actions:
(i) to further clarify Tacis implementation
strategy and to update it regularly;
(ii) to develop criteria to be used in Tacis
programming for assessing the
appropriateness of NIS proposals for funding
in the light of Tacis Programme objectives
and EU policies towards the NIS;
(iii) to develop guidelines on how to
integrate market reform, democracy and
environmental concerns in Tacis
programming; and
(iv) to review the guidelines for the
selection of public and private sector partner
organisations.
11.2 Effectiveness and impact
The Evaluation Team considers that the impact of
the Tacis policy advice component has been
relatively weak, taking account of the quality and
appropriateness of some of the projects for NIS
policy and decision makers in the public sector.
Factors undermining impact are ineffective
dissemination strategies, unclear responsibilities
for follow-up after project completion, as well as
the gap between NIS middle management level,
where Tacis projects intervene, and NIS top
management, where decisions are made. As a
priority, the Evaluation Team identifies the need
for stronger political presence in the main partner
countries and a regular policy dialogue as
envisaged in the PCA agreements.
Recommendation 6: to ensure that the full
weight of the EU is felt in the NIS through a
network of Commission delegations extended
to ensure full NIS coverage; empower the
delegations to become more effective
channels for promoting EU policy and Tacis
Programme objectives.
Tacis faces the challenge of finding ways to
bridge the gap between the middle management
level in the NIS who work with Tacis, and the
decision making levels in the NIS. Too often,
Tacis policy advice does not find its way into NIS
official policy papers.
Recommendation 7: to implement a strategy
for increasing Tacis policy advice impact by
the following:
(i) Link the role of the Delegations in the
policy dialogue to an active role in promotion
and dissemination of project results;
(ii) Implement special reviews with top
government officials and parliamentarians, to
assess the appropriateness of Tacis policy
advice;
(iii) Strengthen the coordination role of the
Delegation in order to target project activities
more directly to ensure improved impact of
project results;
(iv) Select the POs for policy and state
machinery reform work for their abilities to
have access to top decision making levels;
and
(v) Actively support the development of a
“Godfather” network for the individual
projects;
(vi) Select team leaders for their proven
abilities to network and champion the results
of the projects.
The Evaluation Team has identified ways in
which Tacis could further increase the overall
effectiveness and impact of its project portfolio:
Recommendation 8: to use part of the Tacis
investment share authorised by the 1996
Council Regulation as a fund for making
investments to follow up Tacis TA projects.
Such investments are needed to start the
implementation phase, perhaps as a pilot
scheme, in support of the TA advice provided,
thus giving a concrete demonstration of its
value.
Recommendation 9: to enforce the internal
Tacis programming guidelines which link the
approval of feasibility studies with clear
interest for such investment, as demonstrated
by identification/promotion studies of the
EBRD, and World Bank etc.
Recommendation 10: to increase funding for
co-financing facilities (PCP, LIEN,
Democracy). These instruments can be highly
cost-effective provided they are managed
efficiently. Moreover, Tacis experience also
shows that NGOs can play an important role in
the NIS in the provision of social security and
health services.
The Evaluation Team agrees with the views
expressed by their interview partners: Tacis
efficiency, effectiveness and ultimately impact
can be reinforce by increasing the use of NIS
staff and experts in Tacis projects. The value of
NIS personnel involvement lies in their
appreciation of the national environment in which
the projects are placed, their ability to liaise
between contractor, PO and government
apparatus and in their in-depth knowledge of local
conditions.
Recommendation 11: to actively promote
development of the consultancy market in the
NIS by encouraging the involvement of local
consultants in Tacis projects, by ensuring
equal opportunity of access to participation in
tendering, by shortlisting as lead consultants
and by emphasising in the tender instructions
the importance of working through and with
local consultancy companies rather than with
individual experts.
11.3 Management efficiency
The Evaluation Team observes that Tacis has
been understaffed from the beginning of the
programme and believes that the best investment
which the Commission could make to improve the
functioning of the Tacis Programme would be to
allocate a sizeable number of new staff posts to
Tacis; better use should also be made of the staff
available.
Recommendation 12: to increase staff
resources and training. Tacis staffing levels
should be increased, to reduce individual
workloads and size of project portfolios to
reasonable proportions. Administrative and
financial procedures should be simplified to
reduce staff workload. Resources for travel
should be increased to allow senior officials
and Task Managers to build up familiarity with
the field status of projects. New staff
members should be given more training, e.g.
to ensure consistent application of Tacis
project cycle management procedures and to
increase their professional ability to handle
project implementation.
The Evaluation Team considers that the
involvement of project partners should be
increased at every level of project preparation
and project implementation. Project partners
should be more fully involved in the definition of
the TOR and in the preparation on the ground for
project start-up. Participation of the project
partner at this stage and in the management of
project implementation should be made
obligatory. This would ensure the selection of
project partners who are committed, a major
factor in achieving impact.
Recommendation 13: to increase project
partner involvement and issue guidelines.
Such guidelines could usefully establish best
practice aimed at increasing the PO sense of
ownership for its Tacis projects.
The duration of Tacis contracts is often shorter
than circumstances in the NIS require. Many
requests for the extension of time and/or budget
are reasonable and should be allowed. Too often,
contracting procedures do not allow further
budget extensions and projects come to an abrupt
halt when continuation would make sense and
would be cost-effective.
Recommendation 14: to create a contract
bridging fund as a new instrument available in
all NIS, administered by the Delegations or
CUs in consultation with the TMs. Its purpose
would be to increase flexibility and continuity
in the project management cycle. It should be
able to award small direct continuation
contracts for national programme projects
which are good, but which come to a
premature end or will be discontinued for a
period because of contracting and tendering
procedures.
11.4 Transparency, accountability
and image
The mounting criticism of Tacis should be treated
as a warning by Tacis management. The
programme has evolved and become more
mature. At the same time, it has become more
bureaucratic, with procedures which reflect
concerns over accountability, to the detriment of
efficiency. The NIS partners (CUs and POs) and
EU contractors all comment on the slowness and
inflexibility of Tacis operations. At the moment,
18 signatories are necessary for the approval of
new contracts, and transfers between budget
lines, which are neutral in terms of financial
incidence, still require a formal amendment to the
contract.
Recommendation 15: the Commission should
review its administrative and financial
procedures in order to create a leaner and
more flexible administration needed to
implement projects efficiently in the NIS
environment.
The Evaluation Team observes that the
distribution of rights and responsibilities of the
various actors in the Tacis Programme is not very
well defined. The different situations in each
country, in part explain this. Nevertheless, the
Evaluation Team believes that a further
clarification would increase the transparency of
the programme.
Recommendation 16: Tacis management
should clarify further the distribution of tasks
between Task Managers in Brussels,
Delegation staff and the Co-ordinating Units.
Responsibilities should be assigned on the
basis that the Task Manager is formally
accountable for the project objective and the
budget. Responsibility for issues of project
strategy and implementation which do not
conflict with the approved objective and
budget could be decentralised to the country
level. In this context, the partner organisation
should be recognised as a full partner in
management discussions.
The Evaluation Team observes that the Tacis
Programme’s image, both in the EU and the NIS,
is less positive than the findings of this evaluation
justify. This unfavourable image undermines the
programme’s effectiveness and detracts from the
programme’s achievements in many areas.
Recommendation 17: to improve
communication strategies through the
dissemination of previous Tacis project
outputs and processes, improve
communication between Tacis projects and
those of other donors and improve the image
of Tacis in the EU and the NIS.
